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November 2010
 Part A  
 
 
1. Summary and recommendations 
 
Since 2006 there has been welcome strengthening of the data protection regime, a 
higher and better informed level of debate and scrutiny of surveillance related 
developments as well as a renewed political commitment to address the unwanted 
consequences of existing measures that raise concerns about unwarranted surveillance 
of the citizen. 
 
Despite these welcome changes, technological and societal developments have 
proceeded and the risks to individual privacy remain real. Further safeguards are still 
required and require further protection. The Commissioner recommends: 
 
 
a. Increased adoption of a ‘privacy by design’ approach through greater use of 
privacy impact assessments and adoption of privacy enhancing technologies 
across public and private sectors aimed at ensuring reductions in 
information risks 
 
b. Inclusion of robust privacy safeguards as the default setting when new on 
line services are offered to individuals  
 
 
c. A requirement for a privacy impact assessment to be presented during the 
parliamentary process where legislative measures have a particular impact 
on privacy 
 
d. An opportunity for the Information Commissioner to provide a reasoned 
opinion to Parliament on measures that engage concerns within his areas of 
competence 
 
 
e. Increased post legislative scrutiny of legislation, based on a formal report 
on the deployment  of  the legislation in practice, the value of the 
information collected, the impact on privacy and the continued need for 
such measures 
 
f. In certain appropriate circumstances inclusion of a sunset clause in 
legislation that is particularly privacy intrusive 
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 2. Introduction 
 
The Home Affairs Committee in its report on its inquiry entitled “A Surveillance Society?” 
(HC 58-1) recommended that the Information Commissioner produce a report to 
Parliament on the state of surveillance (recommendation 2, paragraph 36). This report is 
in response to that request. The Commissioner had given evidence to that inquiry 
submitting in evidence  commissioned research entitled  “A Report on the Surveillance 
Society” produced by the Surveillance Studies Network, a group of respected academics 
and experts in this field. That report was published by the Commissioner in 2006 and 
this led to increased parliamentary, media and public interest in the developing 
capability to monitor and record information about citizens as they go about their daily 
lives. That report observed that much of what is taken as surveillance is undertaken for 
benign reasons with the aim of providing beneficial results for individuals and society. 
However the capacity to record information and to do so in many different contexts was 
increasing and this posed risks to individuals and society as a whole that needed to be 
addressed. 
 
In the intervening period the Commissioner has developed his approach from one of 
helping ensure proper debate about developments to one of developing tools to assist 
with the effective proactive consideration and addressing of privacy risks in new 
developments. The production of a Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook and 
encouraging a ‘Privacy by Design’ approach to building privacy safeguards from first 
principles are examples of the practical focus of this work. 
 
Since 2006 the value and vulnerability of personal information has become increasingly 
apparent with high profile information security breaches. This has further engaged the 
concerns of the public, parliamentarians and the media. It was apparent that information 
risk had outpaced the safeguards and governance in organisations as well as the 
regulatory sanctions necessary to encourage responsible use of personal information and 
to deter and punish those who do not live up to their legal responsibilities. The 
Commissioner has been given powers to impose monetary penalties for significant 
breaches of the law, to draft a statutory information sharing code of practice to 
encourage best practice and to carry out non consensual audit and inspection activities. 
 
More recently concern over increased surveillance has become an election issue. The 
new Government has declared its wish to increase citizen control of their information and 
roll back what has been described as “the database state”. These ambitions are in their 
early phase and how these will be met not yet fully articulated. 
 
It is against this backcloth of substantial developments since 2006 that the current state 
of surveillance and the adequacy of any safeguards must be judged.  
 
 
 
 
3 
 3. Developments in surveillance since 2006 
 
The centrepiece of this report is the attached update report by the SSN entitled “The 
Surveillance Society-An update report on developments since the 2006 Report on the 
Surveillance Society”. The Commissioner is indebted to the team that produced the 
report for again producing an expert and perceptive analysis. Their report gauges the 
changes between the original report and the present day. The report provides an 
authoritative account of the main trends and developments in surveillance in the United 
Kingdom and draws conclusions on whether safeguards and regulation have kept pace 
with these developments. 
 
The report examines the information collected on individuals. It describes the 
proliferation of government databases, the increased use of CCTV and allied technology 
like automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) and how these can creep beyond their 
original function. It goes on to look at how there is increasing sophistication in the 
combination, analysis and sharing of information with the effect of sorting individuals 
into different categories. It notes how privacy risk can increase as personal information 
is shared more widely and how trends in social networking create new significant 
challenges. 
 
The report analyses the impact of these developments noting that these engage a host 
of privacy and human rights issues. These arise from increased analysis of information 
and profiling of individuals, wider sharing sometimes for undeclared purposes and the 
flow of information beyond national boundaries. Function creep continues to be apparent 
and this undermines transparency and accountability. This is further underscored by the 
blurring of boundaries between the public and private sectors. 
 
The report notes that since 2006 visual, covert, database and other forms of surveillance 
have proceeded apace and that it has been a challenge for regulators who often have 
limited powers at their disposal, to keep up. The report looks at how the regulatory 
landscape has changed and how this may do so in the future.  The report observes that 
the quality of debate surrounding developments is hampering proper consideration. 
Anticipating and controlling new developments is a constant challenge. This has become 
more difficult as issues become enveloped in  what is described as a ‘hyperbolic fog’ of 
claims and counterclaims about benefits and dangers concluding that Parliamentary and 
regulatory scrutiny would be improved with less exaggeration of the benefits and the 
dangers of surveillance.  
 
The report concludes that there has been a better level of public, media and political 
debate since the previous report with surveillance becoming an election issue and being 
one of the first matters to be addressed by the incoming government. However, there 
are still many areas where surveillance continues to intensify and expand. Technologies 
that used to be the subject of speculation have moved into mainstream use. The linking 
and sharing of data from different databases, development of facial recognition, the 
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 increased rollout of ANPR, private sector data gathering and analysis and increased 
information sharing are of particular note. In the longer term the continued development 
of ‘ubiquitous computing’, the deployment of sensing devices and the use of analytical 
tools to predict human behaviours will continue to challenge the existing regulatory 
repertoire and traditional assumptions. 
 
The report poses the question whether regulation and crucially the awareness of the 
public has kept pace with the development of surveillance since 2006. It recognises that 
the increased powers within the regulatory system and the encouraging efforts in both 
public and private sectors to change the culture in personal information practices have 
been positive developments. It also recognises the role played by privacy impact and 
other proactive assessment methodologies and the increased interest in embedding 
privacy friendly mechanisms. However it observes that these must become the norm not 
the exception as at present. It concludes that important questions are whether current 
legal instruments on data protection and human rights at both domestic and European 
level are robust enough to limit surveillance and excessive collection of data and 
whether legal reform and better integration of the legal and other regulatory instruments 
will be the linchpin on which much else depends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 4. Information Commissioner’s perspective 
 
The Commissioner believes that the analysis of the developments in surveillance 
described in the report is soundly based. He recognises developments that have caused 
him to intervene to ensure that a data protection compliant approach is adopted. The 
creation of a national ANPR data centre by the police, the blanket requirement by some 
licensing authorities to install CCTV in all licensed premises irrespective of need, the 
fingerprinting of passengers using common departure lounges at airports and the 
creation of ‘blacklist’ databases are all instances. The continued stream of self reported 
security breaches continues to underline the risks to individuals’ personal details.  
 
He remains concerned to ensure that effective safeguards are in place to minimise 
information risk which can increase if developments in surveillance and greater 
exploitation of personal information go unchecked. He believes that whilst there have 
been welcome developments such as strengthening the data protection regime, greater 
scrutiny of surveillance developments and greater questioning as to whether existing 
developments go too far, there are still opportunities available to strengthen the 
safeguards that will help ensure that we do not end up with a society where citizen 
surveillance and inadequate protections become the norm. 
 
The Commissioner believes that there is still greater scope for the adoption of a ‘privacy 
by design’ approach. Using privacy impact assessments and then adopting privacy 
enhancing technologies can do much to ensure that information risk is identified and 
then minimised. There is a worrying trend particularly with those who provide on-line 
services not to have thought through the privacy implications of their activities and given 
users robust privacy settings as a default.  
 
On a more positive note it is clear that there is an increasing appetite for privacy friendly 
techniques in areas such as identity management, that help minimise personal data and 
put individuals increasingly in control of their information. Similarly there are privacy 
enhancing technologies which minimise access to identifying particulars and other 
personal information whilst still delivering the benefits sought in the first place. Whilst 
the Commissioner has worked hard to promote these, including developing a business 
case for adopting proactive privacy protection entitled ‘The Privacy Dividend’ much more 
still needs to be done. Adoption of proactive privacy safeguards could be much improved 
and innovation in the protection of personal information continues to lag behind the 
motivation and capability to exploit it. The Commissioner will be continuing to work to 
ensure that more is done to improve the current situation. 
 
The report points towards particular gaps in the way developments are scrutinised not 
only during the process of debate and analysis but also in post implementation scrutiny. 
A number of examples in the report point to the use of powers granted to the 
Government and public bodies by Parliament to deal with pressing public policy concerns 
being used over time to address les pressing matters in a disproportionate way. 
 
6 
  
The Commissioner recognises that the parliamentary process is designed to provide 
thorough scrutiny of new measures but that this can be hampered when the assertions 
of those either for or against surveillance related developments are presented with little 
concrete evidence established on which to base decisions. The Commissioner suggests 
that imposing a requirement on Government to conduct a privacy impact assessment 
when bringing forward any law which engages concerns about increased collection and 
exploitation of personal details of citizens may aid parliamentary scrutiny. Those who 
make claims and counterclaims would have to back up their assertions with facts and 
evidence enabling conclusions to be drawn on whether the proposed measures are 
effective and proportionate when set against the impact on personal privacy. This 
assessment would be submitted as part of the scrutiny of such legislation. Providing the 
Commissioner with a formal opportunity to provide Parliamentarians with a reasoned 
opinion during the passage of legislation that impacts on information rights is a further 
possible option. 
 
The Commissioner understands that on some occasions there may be emerging and 
pressing matters where the full scale of a problem and the impact of the proposed 
solution is difficult to judge or scrutinise. Where potentially far reaching measures are 
proposed which involve the collection, use or exploitation of personal information for 
new or different purposes then a form of enhanced post legislative scrutiny is required. 
 
Parliamentary Committees already play an invaluable role in holding the Government 
and others to account for the use of powers granted to them. However this process is 
inevitably inconsistent as Parliamentary committees struggle under the weight of 
business and the range of matters which they must address. The Commissioner 
proposes a more formal and consistent approach to ensuring post legislative scrutiny. 
Legislation engaging significant privacy concerns should include on the face of it a 
requirement on the Government to report back to Parliament on how the measures have 
been deployed including evidence of the extent to which the expected benefits and 
possible risks have been realised in practice and the continued need for the measures in 
question. In certain cases consideration should be given to the inclusion of ‘sunset 
clauses’ which would cause legislation to lapse unless renewed on the basis of evidence 
of continuing value. 
 
It is clear that where difficult issues affecting the balance between matters such as 
security, crime prevention and detection, transparency and privacy are concerned 
Parliament has a central role to play in ensuring proper debate and scrutiny particularly 
in the face of strongly argued assertions by proponents and opponents. The proposals 
suggested by the Commissioner for compulsory privacy impact assessments during the 
passage of legislation backed up by effective post legislative scrutiny once the legislation 
is being used in practice are aimed at assisting parliamentarians in their essential tasks. 
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Part B 
 
The Surveillance Society  
 
An update report on developments since the 2006 Report on the Surveillance 
Society by members of the Surveillance Studies Network  
 
Charles Raab, Kirstie Ball, Steve Graham, David Lyon, David Murakami Wood, 
Clive Norris 
 
1 - Executive Summary  
 
This report selectively describes developments in surveillance since the 
publication of the Report on the Surveillance Society written by members of the 
Surveillance Studies Network (SSN) for the ICO in 2006. It comments on trends, 
new practices, and the regulatory landscape of responses and prospects.  
 
The warning that the United Kingdom may be ‘sleepwalking into a surveillance 
society’ – or that one already exists, requiring limitation and regulation – is no 
less cogent in 2010 than it was several years ago. It is not being suggested that 
the UK is a ‘police state’ or that there are surveillance conspiracies afoot against 
the public. Neither the 2006 report nor this one supports such an assumption, 
and evidence for it is lacking. Much of what is taken to be surveillance is done for 
benign reasons and has beneficial effects on individuals and society. But much 
surveillance also goes beyond the limits of what is tolerable in a society based on 
the rule of law and human rights, one of which is the right to privacy. 
 
Surveillance involves the use of techniques to gather and use information about 
individuals – their personal details, their movements and social contacts, their 
habits and behaviour, their communication – in order to make administrative or 
business decisions that affect their life chances and those of the groups or 
categories into which they are construed to fall. Surveillance has ancient roots in 
society and the state, but in today’s world it engages the latest technologies to 
gather more data, to analyse it in minute detail, and to disclose and share it 
rapidly with a wide number of others, both within the UK and across national 
boundaries.  
 
Since 2006, visual, covert, database and other forms of surveillance have 
proceeded apace, with regulators working hard to apply their often-limited 
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 powers or to anticipate and control the next developments. Surveillance practices 
are often surreptitious, non-transparent, and unaccountable. The aims, motives 
and procedures of those who collect and use personal information are often 
unclear, and therefore difficult to regulate, even when they fall within the scope 
of the law.  
 
Some commentators have noted the ‘hyperbolic fog’ that surrounds debate 
around one of the databases that have been in the spotlight in recent years – a 
ratcheting-up of claims and counter-claims by critics and champions of 
surveillance that does a disservice to public understanding and political or 
regulatory effectiveness. Parliamentary oversight as well as the work of statutory 
regulators requires less exaggeration of the benefits and dangers of surveillance, 
and a better grounding in knowledge of what the state of play is regarding 
surveillance and what is likely to occur in future.  
 
For convenience, this report marshals evidence of trends and developments in UK 
surveillance under three main but overlapping headings: 
 
• Information collection 
• Information processing 
• Information dissemination 
 
It looks briefly but indicatively at information collection in terms of overt and 
covert surveillance, the proliferation of government databases, the burgeoning 
use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) and the increasing employment of 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) in ways that ‘creep’ beyond their 
original intended function. Although they might become issues largely for the 
future, it considers the use of unmanned drones and body scanning to detect. 
The report also looks into the collection of data in relation to border controls and 
the monitoring of employees in the workplace. 
 
Information processing is not clearly separate from collection, and is highlighted 
by techniques of data combination and analysis, and by data sharing. The use of 
personal data gathered by ANPR in controlling protest activities is given as an 
example of the public-order application of data processing, and the increasing 
use of geodemographic tools (the combination of digital mapping technologies 
with individual or aggregated personal data) shows how people’s spatial 
movements and locations are tracked, monitored, and represented by data. The 
processing of information for public-service administration is described, involving 
the sorting of populations into categories. Ethnic targeting features in some of 
the ways in which data are collected and processed, and – in the private sector, 
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 but not confined to it – call centres illustrate the issues involved in the processing 
of data for certain activities. 
 
The report considers information dissemination in terms of the broader 
communication or disclosure of personal information to a wide audience. The 
sharing of data between organisations has become a main means for this, and 
data breaches have also resulted in potentially widespread dissemination through 
unintended lapses in care and security. The huge growth in social networking is 
the most dramatic example of recent years, and has generated new and difficult 
privacy and data-protection issues on a global scale that pose a challenge to 
national regulators and law.  
 
Turning to the implications of these aspects and examples of surveillance, and 
reflected in the trends of recent years, the report comments upon problems and 
issues regarding: 
 
• Privacy, ethics and human rights 
• ‘Function creep’ 
• Transparency and accountability 
• Blurring of the public and the private 
• Unintended consequences 
 
There are a host of privacy and human-rights issues involved in, for instance, 
techniques for analysing data about individuals, the sharing of data among 
organisations – often for undeclared and unconsented purposes – and the flow of 
data across national boundaries. ‘Function creep’ has been much commented 
upon, involving new uses for technologies or for data beyond what was originally 
envisaged or legitimated: for example, certain uses of ANPR and of databases 
collected ostensibly – and possibly under legislation – for a defined purpose. 
Such practices, as well as the sharing of data, make transparency and 
accountability very difficult, not only for regulators but for the public who are 
asking increasingly about what happens to their information. The public and 
private sectors are no longer discretely bounded, as data flows across them 
between the state and private companies in complex pathways. The distinction 
between private and public activities are also blurred, with one result being 
unintended consequences of practices that people engage in, for example 
exposing their ‘private’ and intimate social networking activities to wider 
audiences. There are serious privacy and ethical dilemmas in these trends. 
 
Finally, the report reviews regulatory developments and problems, focusing on 
challenges and responses in recent years, in which the UK has seen a plethora of 
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 parliamentary and other reports about surveillance and its implications for 
privacy and other social values, and has witnessed massive data breaches as well 
as other violations of data protection principles and information rights. Responses 
have featured innovations such as Privacy Impact Assessment, the 
encouragement of better data handling and more regulated systems for sharing 
data, stronger ICO powers and penalties, and more effective codes of practice. 
But the regulatory future is hard to discern in detail, including the likely revision 
of the European Data Protection Directive and consequent changes to UK law, 
and the efforts of the new Government to limit the perceived excesses of the 
‘surveillance society’. 
  
The report finishes by canvassing some proposals that have been made 
elsewhere for strengthening, and integrating better, the regulatory forces of 
official agencies and civil-society as well, and for increasing the international 
efforts to limit surveillance and to protect privacy and related values. Whether 
these will be necessary or sufficient is a matter for discussion.     
  
 
11 
 2 - Background  
 
In 2006, the Report on the Surveillance Society,1 produced by members of the 
Surveillance Studies Network (SSN) for the ICO, argued that we are already 
living in a surveillance society. The report defined the surveillance society as one 
that is organised and structured using surveillance-based techniques. There was 
no suggestion, then or now, that the United Kingdom was or is becoming a 
‘police state’, or a society under total and malevolent control, as some 
commentators may assert. The report stated that to be under surveillance meant 
having information about one’s movements and activities recorded by 
technologies, on behalf of the organisations and governments that structure the 
society. The report showed how this information is then sorted, sifted and 
categorised, and used as a basis for decisions that affect our life chances.  Such 
decisions concern our entitlement and access to benefits, work, products, 
services, and criminal justice. They concern our health and well-being, and our 
movement through public and private spaces: in other words, most of what is 
regarded as our ‘everyday’ life. 
 
Amongst the indicators, the report noted: 
 
• The increasing ubiquity of video surveillance cameras, and automatic 
systems for number plate (and face) recognition 
• Electronic tagging of those on probation 
• DNA and many other databases, and ‘precautionary’ intervention   
• The need to prove identity, for benefits, healthcare and so on, including the 
proposed new system of biometric ID cards linked to a central database of 
personal information  
• Proposals for biometric passports and surveillance at borders   
• The use of multiple surveillance systems in schools 
• Consumer surveillance, the collection and sale of data, and the use of these 
data to provide differential levels of service  
• The monitoring of telephone and Internet communications by intelligence 
agencies  
• The monitoring of performance in the workplace. 
 
                                      
1 David Murakami Wood (ed.), Kirstie Ball, David Lyon, Clive Norris and Charles Raab, A Report on the Surveillance 
Society for the Information Commissioners Office by the Surveillance Studies Network: Full Report, 2006, available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/surveillance_society_full_report_20
06.pdf, accessed 15/06/10..  
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 The SSN argued that this society is the sum total of many different technological 
changes, policy decisions, and social developments. Some of it was shown to be 
essential for providing the services we need, for example, health, social security, 
and education, but some were considered to be unjustified, intrusive and 
oppressive. The report noted that until that point, there had been very little 
public debate about surveillance. At the same time, it was estimated that the 
global surveillance industry was worth almost 1 trillion US dollars, covering a 
massive range of goods and services from military equipment through high street 
CCTV to smart cards.  
 
It was stated very specifically that this was not a conspiracy or always a matter 
of deliberate policy, but the result of a confluence of many different trends, and 
the report noted that the intention behind many surveillance systems was 
benign. Nevertheless it was argued that this did not justify apathy or a lack of 
scrutiny and regulation, and that understanding the often unintentional 
controlling effects of surveillance and the impacts they have on our personal lives 
and on society was crucial.  
 
This analysis was placed in a social context that had become increasingly 
concerned with risks and dangers (both to security and to profit), rather than 
positive social goals. Thinking of more and more everyday situations in terms of 
‘risk’ leads to what was previously exceptional security becoming normal, and to 
many unintended consequences that generate inequalities of access and 
opportunity, and distinctions of class, race, gender, geography and citizenship. 
These discriminations are not only made worse but also fixed into the way all 
everyday decisions are made. 
 
One of the biggest effects of surveillance processes and practices is to create a 
world where we are not really trusted. Surveillance, it was argued, fosters 
suspicion, whether this is in the private sector – with the employer who installs 
keystroke monitors at workstations, or tracking devices in service vehicles – or in 
state services, where the welfare benefits administrator seeking evidence of 
double-dipping or soliciting tip-offs on a possible ‘spouse-in-the-house’ is saying 
she does not trust her clients. Even at the personal level, there were an 
increasing number of technologies designed for parental use in checking on 
children’s activities. Trust, therefore, as much as privacy, was the major casualty 
of the surveillance society. 
 
But at the same time, it was shown that the decline of trust creates a further 
demand for more certainty about those others we no longer trust: about 
backgrounds, identities, interests, motives, and even likely future behaviour. This 
 
13 
 demand places a high priority on the collection and analysis of personal 
information, storing it in large databases with increasing interaction and sharing 
of data. The report asked whether we had become so hypnotised by the ‘need’ to 
find high technology solutions to crime, terrorism, fraud and many other 
problems that we forget to ask whether these solutions even work in the ways 
they were intended, let alone whether they were appropriate in a wider social 
context, or might have consequential side-effects, and whether there might be 
other, non-technological or less invasive answers. The report did not discount 
that possibility that people may want to live in a surveillance society, but if that 
was the case, it was argued that it had to be something decided in full 
understanding, with our eyes open and not in our sleep.  
 
All these themes and analyses that were explored are at least as relevant in 2010 
as they were in 2006. This much briefer Update Report focuses on the key 
thematic developments since the 2006 report. These include: 
 
• the increasing blurring of private/public sector boundaries in collecting and 
processing surveillance data 
• the increasing nodes in the system, both public and private, where 
information is collected, processed and shared 
• the application of more sophisticated analytics for data-mining and 
profiling, leading to enhanced mechanisms to privilege, prioritise and 
exclude 
• the decreasing visibility of surveillance processes, which is paralleled by an 
increase in their social consequences. 
 
Research for this report was guided by some key questions that remain pertinent 
today: 
  
• are there new applications of technology? 
• are there new instances of ‘function creep’? 
• have new unintended consequences been produced? 
• have there been new instances of information-sharing across public/private 
boundaries? 
• have new forms of analysis been applied to personal data? 
• whose lives have been enabled and constrained, and how has this 
changed? 
• has public accountability for surveillance practices changed? 
• are there new challenges to the regulation and limitation of surveillance? 
• have the recommendations of parliamentary reports been satisfactorily 
implemented?  
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 • how have the possibilities and practices of public and parliamentary 
scrutiny changed? 
• are the surveillance and regulatory trends of recent years likely to 
continue?  
 
Documenting and analysing the impact of these developments forms the core of 
the report, with particular attention to their implications and the challenges they 
pose for regulatory regimes.  
 
3 - Main Areas of Surveillance, 2006-10  
 
The current report concentrates on a small number of areas and recent trends in 
surveillance, but seen in terms of the processes they illustrate, and the issues to 
which these processes give rise, before the penultimate section considers the 
implications of these processes and issues for policy and regulation. 
 
Three types of activity that can present privacy problems and lead to regulatory 
challenges and responses are identified. These are the collection, processing and 
dissemination of information.2 
 
The surveillance processes highlighted are described under these headings, 
although in many cases the examples involve more than one of these kinds of 
activity. It should be borne in mind that there are also beneficial purposes served 
by activities in these groups, but in focusing on the potential regulatory 
problems, attention must be concentrated on the more disturbing effects on 
individuals and society. It can also be argued that the balance between the more 
positive and caring aspects of surveillance and those that are more harmful has 
shifted even more towards the latter in recent years. The examples described in 
each of the three subsections give rise to a number of implications and issues to 
be dealt with by public policy and regulation. Comments upon these issues are 
given later in the report. 
 
 
 
 
                                      
2 This reflects, in part, the taxonomy in Daniel J. Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’, University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 154, 3, 2006, pp. 477-560. His fourth category, ‘invasion’, involves intrusion and interference with decisions. It 
eed not involve personal information, but often does, and sometimes represents the effects of social sorting and covert 
urveillance that are discussed at a later point. 
n
s
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 4 - Trends in Surveillance 
 
Information Collection 
The collection of personal information has become increasingly central to the 
activities of organisations in both the public and private sectors. Many large 
databases of personal information have been created on segments of the 
population, and online collections of data in social networking, commercial and 
governmental contexts are now common features of contemporary life in the UK. 
The covert or overt surveillance of the population, especially in public places, 
along with tracking physical movement and behaviour, overlap with database 
collections. The 2006 report illustrated the prevalence of these activities; since 
then, we have not until very recently seen any significant decline in the practices, 
nor any major increase in regulation. This report touches on, but does not 
discuss at length or systematically the increase in surveillance operations 
conducted by police and other public authorities under the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. This has attracted criticism, perhaps most 
notably in the case of its use in fairly trivial circumstances by local authorities, 
whose use of RIPA powers – not envisaged in the original legislation – has 
proliferated, attracting public and parliamentary criticism.3 Other matters of 
serious concern include the procedures for authorisation of surveillance 
operations, and the fragmented system of oversight through Commissioners, 
both of which have cast doubt upon the effectiveness of surveillance regulation 
under one of its main legitimising statutes. 
 
However, as we shall note, the recent change of Government has now led to 
some significant rolling back in some areas of state data collection, and further 
changes are promised, although in a number of cases are far from certain to be 
put in place. This should not, however, distract attention from those areas that 
remain unaffected, nor from the growing importance of private sector data 
collection. 
 
Government databases  
Public services rely heavily on the collection and further processing of large 
amounts of personal data, increasingly so because of the trend towards 
anticipatory, proactive and predictive policy-making and implementation. In 
2006, the SSN reported that the use of personal information for public services is 
a form of surveillance that poses threats to privacy and other social values, even 
though it serves beneficial purposes: saving lives, protecting the vulnerable, and 
                                      
3 e.g. House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 2nd Report of Session 2008-09, Surveillance: Citizens and the 
State, HL Paper 18-I, paras. 153-77. 
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 making public services more efficient and effective.4 On the other hand, because 
data collection is so ubiquitous, the protection of personal information and the 
restriction of database surveillance is made at once more difficult and more 
necessary. There is little in the experience of the past four years that would 
cause a serious questioning of that overview.  
 
In 2008, the Government’s written evidence to the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee’s surveillance inquiry described a large number of policies, practices 
and systems for personal data collection, data sharing and surveillance in central 
government departments and agencies.5 This report can only deal with a few of 
these; for example, it leaves on one side law-enforcement databases and the 
NHS IT development. In terms of databases, the blurring of the boundaries of the 
public, private and voluntary sectors continues; the aim of ‘joined-up’ 
government – transformed and enabled by technology6 – has not abated, 
although the pace is often halting and in certain sectors, such as health, 
enormous IT implementation difficulties persist. Government still pursues policies 
based on ‘better safe than sorry’ premises that require large amounts of personal 
data to identify and profile those at risk of harm to themselves or to others. 
Parliamentary scrutiny and privacy safeguards lag behind, and there is 
insufficient independent assessment of necessity and proportionality. 
 
It is impossible to say how many databases there are in the public sector, in part 
because the term ‘database’ is not a precise one. It cannot be affirmed that the 
judgments and legality ratings concerning 46 UK state databases made in a 
prominent recent review7 are anchored in reliable methodology yielding sound 
evidence, and those opinions are therefore not endorsed in the present report; in 
addition, the previous Government’s rebuttal is to be noted.8 Nevertheless, that 
study of the ‘database state’ reflects wider concerns about the resort to database 
‘solutions’ to social or policy problems, and served to bring this trend into wider 
public awareness and debate. 
 
For several years following the 2006 report, government’s propensity to process 
                                      
4 Charles D. Raab, ‘Expert Report: Public Services’, in Murakami Wood et al., op cit, A Report on the Surveillance Society 
– Appendices.  
5 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 2nd Report of Session 2008-09, Surveillance: Citizens and the 
State, HL Paper 18-II, pp. 315-41. 
6 Cabinet Office, Transformational Government – Enabled by Technology (Cm 6683), London: The Stationery Office, 
2005. 
7 Ross Anderson, Ian Brown, Terri Dowty, Philip Inglesant, William Heath and Angela Sasse, Database State, York: 
Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, 2009, p. 4. 
8 Ministry of Justice, Government response to the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust report: ‘Database state’, 08/12/2009, 
available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/government-response-rowntree-illegal-databases-report.pdf, accessed 19/04/10. 
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 ever more data continued with, for example, the National Identity Register (NIR), 
the controversial database that formed the heart of the identity cards scheme 
(2006). The Government elected in 2010 has, however, announced the demise of 
identity cards for UK citizens and the destruction of the NIR, although questions 
remain about how its data, which is not unique to the NIR as such and which 
forms part of the life-blood of state administration, will be used. There are 
concerns on grounds of discrimination about the continuation of identity cards for 
non-citizens and the use of data collected for supplying these. Moreover, 
surveillance practices with respect to the identification and verification of 
individuals and their claims persists across government, even in the absence of a 
discrete ‘identity card’. The policy aim to transform government and its services 
through the use of information technology, especially online, is likely to generate 
continuing problems concerning data protection, including data security, and 
possible discriminatory effects, despite the professed reforms in data handling 
that followed the rash of data breaches in 2007 and after.   
 
Another example, still in formation, is the Vetting and Barring Scheme (VBS) 
managed by the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA), established in 
England and Wales and coming on stream from 2010 to 2015.9 The Scheme 
covers those who come into regular contact with children and vulnerable adults 
and requires such paid or voluntary workers, with some categorical exceptions, 
to register with the ISA, with the application and monitoring processes being 
performed by the Criminal Records Bureau, which already operates criminal 
records checks. There will be lists of those who are barred from contact with 
children and vulnerable adults. ISA decisions will be based on information from 
the police as well as referrals from employers and regulatory or other agencies. 
In addition to information on offences, convictions and cautions, evidence of 
‘inappropriate behaviour’ or of behaviour likely to result in harm will be 
considered. The ISA said that ‘[r]eferral information, such as allegations, will 
never lead to automatic inclusion on the ISA Barred Lists. Before a barring 
decision is made, the individual is given the information on which the decision is 
based and the opportunity to explain their case.’  
 
This new system was established following the recommendation in the 2004 
Bichard Report on the Soham murders. However, by saying that the vetting 
scheme ‘is about making sure we can stop that very rare risk, because if it led to 
                                      
9 Factsheets and material formerly on the ISA website at http://www.isa-gov.org.uk/, accessed 24/04/10, are now 
unavailable; FAQs on the website of the Department of Children, Schools and Families at 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/news/index.cfm?event=news.item&id=vetting_and_barring_myth_buster, accessed 24/04/10, are 
now unavailable.  
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 harm, the harm could be devastating’, the previous Government revealed an 
approach to risk that established an elaborate system to guard against events 
that, they admitted, were highly improbable. This raises concerns about the 
disproportionality of a Scheme that, according to some, reverses the assumption 
of innocence regarding the individual and may lead to decisions being influenced 
by ‘soft’ information. The previous Government scaled back its scope following 
criticism, and the current Government has announced that it will ‘review the 
criminal records and vetting and barring regime and scale it back to common 
sense levels’.10 At the time of writing, further details had not been made 
available, although it is to be hoped that a revised Scheme will accord better with 
the spirit of data protection and human rights. A great deal will depend on how 
the Scheme is implemented, including the transparency of decision-making and 
ensuring rigorous safeguards for the data involved in the vetting process. The 
ICO has in the past not been convinced that all the data protection implications 
of VBS had been resolved, but ‘received assurances that the scheme will engage 
with the ICO in constructive dialogue’.11  
 
A further example is the database on all children in England and Wales up to age 
18, on which the Report on the Surveillance Society commented in 2006, and 
which was renamed ‘ContactPoint’. This is intended to improve and speed up 
contact between professionals in children’s services across England and Wales. 
Implementation began in local authorities late in 2009, following a period of 
limited early adoption.12 It may be too soon to evaluate its success13 or its 
avoidance of the potential privacy and human rights dangers highlighted by its 
many critics in NGOs and parliament. These include accessibility by too many 
persons (reportedly, over 330,000), undue interference with family privacy, 
ignoring children’s rights, and violation of European Convention rights under 
Article 8.14  
 
ContactPoint raises privacy concerns over the storage of sensitive data with no 
effective opt-out, lack of security, and potential relationship to the NIR.15 On the 
                                      
10 HM Government: The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 05/2010, p. 20, available at: 
http://programmeforgovernment.hmg.gov.uk/, Accessed 15/06/10. 
11 ICO Policy Committee Minutes, 14/09/09, available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/corporate/notices/20090914_pc_september_mins.pdf, accessed 15/06/10. 
12 Department for Children, Schools and Families, ‘Contactpoint to start national rollout’, 06/11/09, avai e 
isplayPN.cgi?pn_id=2009_0210
labl at: 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/pns/D , accessed 19/04/10.  
13 But there are research-based apprehensions about its usefulness in the daily work of practitioners; see Sue eckover, Sue 
White  Christopher Hall, 
 P
and ‘Making and Managing Electronic Children: e-Assessment in Child Welfare’, Information, 
Communication and Society, 11, 3, 2008, pp. 375-94.  
14 See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Children Bill, Nineteenth Report of Session 2003-04, HL paper 161. 
15 Anderson et al., op cit  pp. 17-18. 
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 other hand, the previous Government robustly defended ContactPoint and 
rejected such criticism in detail as vague and unfounded.16 In this ‘hyperbolic 
fog’17 of criticism and defence, which stifles genuine debate about these issues 
and contributes little to public understanding and sensible policy-making, it can 
still be argued that this and other large databases are likely to pose threats that 
require vigilant regulatory oversight. The new Government has pledged seriously 
to reassess ContactPoint but, again, details about this have not been announced. 
There remain considerable pressures from the child-protection and care 
community for some form of collected data on children, whether gathered 
centrally or not, and even if it is confined to only certain categories of children – 
itself a form of social sorting and discrimination, albeit benevolently intentioned. 
Therefore, it would be premature to consider that the demise of ContactPoint 
itself will reduce concerns about the collection and processing of often sensitive 
and ‘soft’ data on children. 
 
A final example is the National DNA Database (NDNAD), which has caused 
concern because of its collection and retention of millions of samples taken from 
persons over ten years of age and from crime scenes, including the DNA of those 
who were never charged or convicted of a recordable offence. Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have separate databases operating under different retention 
rules. In proportionate terms, the NDNAD is the largest of its kind in the world, 
containing DNA profiles of more then 7 per cent of the UK population. England 
and Wales are unique amongst Member States of the European Union in 
systematically retaining the profiles or samples of individuals who have not been 
convicted of a crime. 
 
Government and the police, as well as critical groups, have seen the NDNAD as 
an essential tool in law enforcement, but many – including parliamentary 
committees – have raised serious concerns, especially with the retention of DNA 
profiles of large numbers of innocent people who should arguably be treated as 
though they had never been arrested. In December 2008, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgement in the case of S. and Marper v. 
the United Kingdom, a case that was brought by two individuals, one of whom 
had been charged with a recordable offence but was subsequently acquitted, and 
the other charged but saw his case discontinued.  Both had requested that their 
DNA be removed from the NDNAD. The ECtHR ruled that the Government’s policy 
breached Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Government then resisted complying with the Court’s ruling. The new 
                                      
16 Ministry of Justice, op cit  pp. 27-9. 
17 Peckover et al., op cit. 
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 Government has now committed itself to implementing the ruling along the lines 
of the Scottish model of deletions and much more limited retention periods.  
 
Two other NDNAD issues remain important. The first concerns possible 
discrimination, in that some groups are over-represented on the database in 
relation to the general population, in part related to stop-and-search policies in 
policing that disproportionately target black and other ethnic minority persons.  
The second is the implications in the development of familial searching 
techniques, whereby offenders who do not have a profile on the database can be 
traced through a close relative who does. This of course represents a significant 
expansion of the reach of the database, which started as one of offenders, then 
of suspects, and now covers the relatives of those on the database.18  
 
Visual surveillance through CCTV and ANPR 
Visual surveillance through CCTV is perhaps the image most people have in mind 
as denoting what ‘surveillance’ means. The use of public-space CCTV has become 
even more widespread for various purposes associated with the prevention and 
detection of crime and the maintenance of public order. Yet its relative 
ineffectiveness in achieving its objectives, despite its public and political support, 
has remained a remarkable anomaly.19 Recognition of the need for improvement 
in CCTV’s ability to fulfil functional expectations came with the promulgation of a 
‘new strategy’ in 2007 by the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO).20 This strategy was aimed at overcoming many of the technical 
and operational flaws of CCTV schemes, and at improving standards, quality and 
training. 
 
CCTV has also continued to find new applications. In September, 2006, 
Middlesbrough police announced that they had fitted 7 of their 158 CCTV 
cameras with loud speakers enabling control-room staff to ‘talk’ to those they 
were monitoring. The aim of the system was to ‘shame’ low-level offenders into 
conformity.21 In April, 2007 talking CCTV was extended to 12 other areas though 
                                      
18 For a discussion about the implications of familial searching see Chris Pounder ‘Issues Arising for the Retention of DNA 
Personal Data’, p. 9, available at: http://www.amberhawk.com/uploads/website%20DNA%20article%202010(2).pdf, 
accessed 15/06/10 
19 The latest meta-evaluation is the Campbell Collaboration report, based partly on research funded by the Home Office, 
which found that there was very little evidence of the success of CCTV except in controlled spaces like car parks. Brandon 
C. Welsh and David P. Farrington, Effects of Closed Circuit Television Surveillance on Crime, Oslo: The Campbell 
Collaboration, 2008.  
20 Home Office and ACPO, National CCTV Strategy, 2007. 
21 ‘Big brother is shouting at you’, Mail Online, 16/09/06, available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
405477/Big-Brother-shouting-you.html, accessed 15/07/10. 
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 the use of a £500,000 grant from the Government’s Respect programme.22 In 
2007, the Home Office initiated a £3 million national roll-out of body-worn CCTV 
to police forces23 after a trial in Plymouth.24 CCTV has also found increasing use 
in less obvious law-enforcement roles. In 2006, the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs commissioned research to produce good-practice 
guidelines for the local authority management of fly-tipping,25 the report 
stressing CCTV’s utility in prosecutions. In particular, it recommended that 
serious consideration be given to the use of covert CCTV, although the good-
practice guidance was silent on how to ensure compliance with RIPA.26 Moreover, 
the use of covert CCTV by local authorities to tackle a range of low-level offences 
from parking to littering to defying the smoking ban have led to calls for local 
authorities to be stripped of their powers under RIPA. The new Government 
intends to ban their use of RIPA powers ‘unless they are signed off by a 
magistrate and required for stopping serious crime’.27  
 
That CCTV has become a routine feature of most urban public space landscapes 
now seems to be taken for granted. However, police and Government attempts 
to impose mandatory CCTV requirements on the private sector have run in to 
some resistance since 2006. In March, 2009 it was reported that the Metropolitan 
Police had insisted to a public-house landlord in Islington that they would oppose 
his licence application unless he installed CCTV. The landlord claimed it was an 
infringement of his customers’ civil liberties, and after the ICO intervened the 
police backed down. A number of other police forces have tried to emulate 
Islington, arguing that landlords believe cameras improve security in pubs, 
although it is the licensing authority, not the police, who make the final decision. 
The previous Government proposed that CCTV systems should be installed in 
licensed premises in positions dictated by the police, with CCTV footage being 
kept for 28 days and made available on request to an authorised person or a 
constable. The ICO argued that, while surveillance in a specific pub can combat 
                                      
22 Philip Johnston, ‘Oi! Talking CCTV cameras will shame offenders’, The Daily Telegraph, 05/04/07, available at:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1547663/Oi-Talking-CCTV-cameras-will-shame-offenders.html, accessed 
15/07/10. 
23 “Smile, you’re on camera!” Police to get “head-cams”’, Mail Online, 13/07/10, available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-467877/Smile-youre-camera-Police-head-cams.html, accessed 15/07/10. 
24 ‘A watching brief with body-worn video devices’, BAPCO Journal, 25/07/07, available at: 
http://www.bapcojournal.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/752/A_watching_brief_with_body-worn_video_devices.html, 
accessed 15/07/10. 
25 http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/local/flytipping/research.htm, accessed 15/07/10. 
26 Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, Fly-tipping: Causes, Incentives and Solutions  – A good practice guide for Local 
Authorities, 6 July 2006, available at: http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/local/flytipping/documents/flytipping-
goodpractice.pdf, accessed 15/07/10. 
27 HM Government, The Coalition: our programme for government, May, 2010, available at: 
http://programmeforgovernment.hmg.gov.uk/files/2010/05/coalition-programme.pdf, accessed 15/07/10. 
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 specific problems of bad behaviour, to hard-wire such blanket coverage where 
there has been no history of criminal activity is likely to breach data protection 
requirements.28 In the end, it appears to have been economic rather than data 
protection considerations which laid rest to these plans: the Government’s 
consultation revealed strong opposition from the industry on financial grounds,29 
and the proposal was withdrawn. 
 
Video surveillance has also expanded in state institutions. In particular, the use 
of CCTV in schools has migrated from perimeter security and access control to 
monitoring pupil behaviour in public areas such as in corridors and playgrounds, 
and to more private realms such as changing rooms and toilets.30 Furthermore, a 
recent survey by the Association of Teachers and Lecturers found that 7 per cent 
of teachers reported CCTV being used to monitor classrooms, raising fears that 
CCTV would be used to monitor teacher performance as well as pupil 
behaviour31. As the function of school CCTV has changed, it is apparent that 
some schools have not understood their new regulatory responsibilities.32 These 
issues are only likely to intensify with new uses for cameras in education, such as 
the remote-operated web-cams on laptops provided for pupils’ home use in the 
USA.33 Similar practices are more likely in the UK if private sector management 
of state schools spreads, as the Government intends.34  
 
The growth in one form of visual surveillance aimed at data collection has 
attracted increasing attention: Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). 
ANPR illustrates the progress of data-enhanced policing, using new technological 
tools to move from being an ‘add-on’ project ‘to becoming a mainstream policing 
tool, integrated into police force strategies and policy, tactics, systems, 
                                      
28 ‘Warning over use of CCTV in pubs’, BBC News, 16/03/09, available at:   http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7946752.stm, 
accessed 15/07/10.  
29 Association of Convenience Stores (ACS),  ‘Response to Safe, Sensible and Social: Selling Alcohol Responsibly’, 
available at: http://www.acs.org.uk/en/lobbying/issues/alcohol/, accessed 15/07/10. 
30 Emmeline Taylor, I Spy with My little Eye: Exploring the Use of Surveillance and CCTV in Schools, Unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Salford, 2009, Chapter 5.  
31 Olinka Koster, ‘Revealed: The CCTV cameras spying on hundreds of classrooms, Daily Mail, 18/08/08, available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1046236/Revealed-The-CCTV-cameras-spying-hundreds-classrooms.html, 
accessed 15/06/10.  
32 See Taylor, op cit.  
33 Ron Todt, ‘School Caught In Spying Scandal Admits Activating Webcams On Students' Laptops’, Huffington Post, 
02/20/10, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/22/harriton-high-school-admi_n_471321.html, accessed 
15/06/10. 
34 Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, ‘Coalition’s schools plan to create 2000 more academies’, The Guardian, 
25/05/2010, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2010/may/25/david-cameron-coalition-academies-plan, 
accessed 15/06/10.  
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 processes, training and baseline funding’.35 However, within the private sector, 
other uses are flourishing, illustrating the collection of information but 
information processing and sharing as well. The Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency (DVLA) does not just supply information to the police, but also to a 
variety of accredited trade associations.36 In 2007, it was reported that the DVLA 
was selling driver details to 157 firms at a charge of £2.50 per enquiry, making 
the details of millions of drivers available to bailiffs, credit-control companies, 
debt collectors, property managers, leisure centres, solicitors and a large 
financial services firm.37 Since 2005, the DVLA is said to have raised an 
estimated £44 million by selling details on 18 million registrations.38
 
ANPR systems in privately owned car parks are increasingly linked to the DVLA 
database and used to enforce parking rules and restrictions through the use of a 
Parking Charge Notice (PCN), akin to a fine, for breaches to the regulations, such 
as overstaying or parking in a restricted area. The DVLA database is used to 
provide the name and address of the registered keeper so the PCN can be sent to 
their home address;39 if not complied with, civil action is undertaken with bailiffs 
potentially being engaged to enforce payment. The possibility that DVLA data 
could be commercially exploited through more novel uses of ANPR technology 
was recently reported. A prominent motor-oil company’s advertising campaign 
included billboards on five major London routes. Roadside cameras recorded 
number plates before flashing their registration onto screens and indicating the 
grade of oil recommended for the vehicle. To enable this precision, another firm 
had apparently been used to obtain vehicle data, believed to have contained 
most of the 34 million-strong driver details held by the DVLA. While the DVLA 
had neither sold its data to the oil company nor given permission for its use in 
this way – which would contravene the prohibition of the use of registration 
numbers for marketing purposes – it appears that data had been supplied to the 
third-party company by a firm to which DVLA does sell data. When the DVLA 
                                      
35 ACPO, ANPR Strategy for the Police Service – 2007/2010, September 2007, p. 2. 
36 DVLA, ‘DVLA Accredited Trade Associations (ATAs)’, available at: http://www.dft.gov.uk/dvla/data/trade.aspx, 
accessed 16/07/10. 
37 Martin Delgado, Rob Ludgate and Mark Nichol, ‘DVLA sells your details to criminals’, Mail Online, 12/02/07, available 
at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-369838/DVLA-sells-details-criminals.html, accessed 16/07/10. 
38 John Oates, ‘DVLA makes £44m flogging drivers' details’, available at: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/01/20/dvla_data_flog/, accessed 16/07/10. 
39 National Parking Control, ‘A.N.P.R. Services’, available at: http://www.nationalparkingcontrol.co.uk/anpr_services.asp, 
accessed 16/07/10. 
 
24 
 complained, the advertising campaign was abandoned.40 These examples provide 
evidence of the process of ‘function creep’, as is pointed out later.  
 
In 2005 ACPO published their National ANPR Strategy, ‘Denying Criminals the 
Use of the Roads 2005/2008’.  The strategy is underpinned by the creation of 
new data flows between cameras and the ANPR database, and between the latter 
and existing databases.  The strategy consisted of four key components, the 
setting up of a national network of ANPR-capable cameras; the creation of 
dedicated force intercept teams; real time linkages with the DVLA database of 
registered keepers of motor vehicles and to the databases contained on the 
Police National Computer (PNC) (the system is also linked to local force 
databases, the Motor Insurance Database and counter terrorism databases); and 
the creation of a National ANPR Data Centre to house a database capable of 
storing 50 million ANPR ‘reads’ per day.41
 
The main aims of ANPR systems extend from the apprehension of owners of 
untaxed and uninsured vehicles, and car thieves, to the wider one of 'targeting 
criminals through their use of the roads’. In so doing, the movements of all 
vehicles, not only those involve in criminal activity, are tracked. There is now a 
national network of some 10,000 ANPR-enabled cameras installed in the UK, as 
well as intercept units in all police forces, a Data Centre lodging some 10-14 
million ANPR ‘reads’ per day,42 and real-time police access to all ANPR reads from 
Transport for London’s (TfL) Congestion Charge scheme, allowing them to track 
all vehicles entering central London. With the advent of vehicle-borne terrorist 
activity, the Home Secretary in 2007 ordered an exemption of TfL from parts of 
the Data Protection Act. While the TfL data can only be used currently for issues 
relating to national security,43 the Home Secretary did not rule out the possibility 
                                      
40 Christopher Leake, ‘Drivers’ details sold by DVLA are used in bizarre roadside adverts for Castrol’, available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1216414/Now-drivers-details-sold-DVLA-used-bizarre-roadside-adverts-
Castrol.html, accessed 16/07/10. 
41 See 'Fears over privacy as police expand surveillance project', The Guardian,15/9/2008, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/sep/15/civil_liberties, accessed 15/06/10 
42 See ‘Police secretly snapping up to 14m drivers a day’, Times Online, 4/4/10, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article7086783.ece, accessed 15/07/10. ACPO  
Freedom of Information requests have revealed an exponential rise in data flow to the National Data Centre from individual 
police forces.  For instance, between 2007 and 2008 Devon and Cornwall police recorded a near 10-fold increase in ANPR 
reads from 6.7 million to 63.9 million and Dyfed-Powys Constabulary recorded a 12-fold increase from 2.6 million to 33.2 
million.  See http://www.dyfedpowys.police.uk/documents/FoIDisclosure/RoadsPolicing/2009/361.pdf, and 
http://www.devoncornwall.police.uk/YourRightInformation/FreedomInformation/Lists/Disclosure%20Logs/Attachments/2
82/Record%201.pdf, accessed 15/06/10. 
43 BBC News, ‘Met given real time c-charge data’, 17/07/2007, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6902543.stm, accessed 15/06/10. 
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 of police using the data for other purposes in future.44 Further uses of ANPR data 
are highlighted later on.   
 
Unmanned drones 
Recent developments in national security technologies – unmanned drones and 
body scanners – provide further examples of novel forms of information 
collection. These are not yet significantly deployed in the UK, but if they were 
more fully implemented in future, they would mount important challenges for 
regulation and surveillance control.  
 
The deployment of unmanned helicopter drones (Micro-Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles, Micro-UAVs, or MAVs) in UK civilian airspace for policing purposes has 
begun with the recent trial conducted by Merseyside Police. Derived from military 
models now widely used in counterinsurgency operations, drones are equipped 
with wirelessly-connected digital CCTV systems that can record extremely high-
resolution images, in the visible and infra-red spectrums, from heights of 500m. 
At 100m hovering height, the drone’s small size and battery power means that it 
is rarely noticed from the ground. It is quite probable that the use of drones will 
become more commonplace in covert surveillance, and will feature in the policing 
of the 2012 Olympic Games. The South Coast Partnership (SCP), a project led by 
Kent Police involving five other police forces in conjunction with BAe Systems, 
plan to pilot the use of drones with a wide range of potential uses. The 
Guardian’s Freedom of Information requests have revealed that the list of 
potential applications includes addressing ‘fly-posting, fly-tipping, abandoned 
vehicles, abnormal loads, waste management’ and ‘[detecting] theft from cash 
machines, preventing theft of tractors and monitoring antisocial driving’.45  
 
Body scanning 
Body scanning has begun to be used in civilian airports in the UK. Full body 
scanners fall into two main types: backscatter machines that use a low-intensity 
X-ray beam to construct a two-dimensional image of the body, and millimetre-
wave machines, that use non-ionising radio frequency energy to detect energy 
radiated from the body as a means to construct a 3-dimensional image. Heralded 
as a means to complement or replace walk-through X-ray and physical pat-down 
                                      
44 ‘Webchat with Jacqui Smith, Home Secretary’, 03/08/2007, The National Archives, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page12804, accessed 15/06/10. 
45 The SCP working groups include representatives from the Serious Organised Crime Agency, HM Revenue and Customs, 
the Maritime and Fisheries Agency, and the UK Border Agency. See Paul Lewis, ‘CCTV in the sky: police plan to use 
military-style spy drones’, The Guardian, 23/01/10, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/23/cctv-sky-
police-plan-drones, accessed 15/06/10. 
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 searches, their advocates argue that such scanners have a far superior ability to 
detect threatening objects held in or about the person. 
 
Responses amongst civil liberties advocates and information commissioners 
centre on the technology’s alleged threats to personal and medical privacy and 
individual dignity, as well as possibilities of misuse. For example, in March 2010, 
a ‘first instance harassment warning’ was issued to a 25-year old male security 
worker at Heathrow, who made lewd comments about a co-worker who had 
mistakenly passed the scanner area.46  
 
Border controls 
More conventional data collection, as well as analysis and dissemination, is in use 
in the e-Borders programme, currently being implemented by the UK Border 
Agency (UKBA) in the Home Office. The programme’s aim is to collect and 
analyse all passenger, service and crew data from air, sea and rail operators that 
provide services into or out of the UK.  The programme relies on the transfer of 
passenger name record (PNR) and passport data collected by private sector 
carriers – charter carriers just have to provide passport information – to the 
UKBA’s data warehouse between 24 hours and 30 minutes in advance of travel. 
There, all data are checked against watch lists, and on certain routes, travel 
patterns are subject to profiles or ‘rules based targeting’ to identify persons 
suspected of being involved in dangerous activities (e.g. drug smuggling). 
Following analysis, ‘risk flags’ are attached to particular names, and the border 
agent then decides whether to alert law enforcement agencies or immigration 
officers to their presence so they can take further action, which could include the 
individual being questioned or detained.  The information is then held for 5 years 
in an active database and a further 5 years in an archive with stricter access 
controls and access on a case-by-case basis. Since 2005, according to a Home 
Office Minister in 2009, 137 million journeys have reportedly been logged, and 
4,700 arrests made.47
 
The success of e-Borders is premised on the collection of all information relating 
to all journeys made into and out of the UK. It has been difficult to implement for 
two reasons. The first concerns infrastructural systems difficulties and costs 
surrounding the transfer of data from private sector carriers to UKBA, and the 
second concerns the ethical implications of total data collection. Whilst significant 
                                      
46 ‘Heathrow worker warned over body scanner misuse’, BBC News, 24/03/10, available at: 
tp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8584484.stmht , accessed 15/06/10. 
47 Charles Kelly, ‘eBorders scheme is legal Border and Immigration Minister confirms’, Immigration Matters, 19/12/09, 
available at: http://www.immigrationmatters.co.uk/e-borders-are-legal-eu-confirms.html, accessed 23/03/10. 
 
27 
 industry investment has overcome the practical problem of ensuring that 
traveller data flow from the private sector to government, including investment 
upstream data capture and transfer to UKBA for advance clearance,  the outcome 
of privacy challenges from the EU is less certain. Pending resolution of the legal 
issues, Eurostar and the ferry companies are still consulting with UKBA over their 
involvement in the programme.48  
 
Workplace Monitoring 
Surveillance practices are part of everyday organisational life. Computer-based 
employee performance monitoring, the tracking of mobile employees through 
GPS applications in their phones, the use of mystery shoppers and the 
monitoring of internet use in the workplace are common examples. Recent 
developments have indicated some new trends that are noteworthy.  The first is 
an increase in the use of CCTV in the workplace. CCTV and other surveillance 
measures have been recently identified as the solution to fraud and dishonesty at 
work that costs UK businesses upwards of £2 billion per year49. Despite the 
proliferation of CCTV policies, complaints to the ICO about CCTV abuses have 
risen in the last year. School teachers, in particular, have found that CCTV 
installed to control pupil behaviour has been used to monitor their teaching 
performance.50   
 
The mobile phone now sports a range of different applications and many support 
GPS mapping functions, which provide extremely useful navigational aids for 
their users.  Others support accelerometers, which analyse the speed and 
direction of the movement of the mobile phone and can enable it to be used as a 
spirit level or in a whole new range of gaming applications.  However, both these 
developments raise serious issues of function creep.  The networked capability of 
mobile phones coupled with GPS, illustrating a form of geodemographics – the 
combination of digital mapping technologies with individual or aggregated 
personal data, which is discussed more extensively below – can now enable 
employers to track the whereabouts of their employees to within a few metres of 
accuracy, and the accelerometers can be used to monitor worker performance. 
For instance, one Japanese company has developed a management application to 
monitor worker performance though exploiting the accelerometer’s properties as 
a ‘mobile phone strapped to a cleaning worker's waist [that] can tell the 
                                      
48 See Kirstie Ball, Elizabeth Daniel, Sally Dibb, Maureen Meadows and Keith Spiller, ‘Exploring private sector responses 
to government surveillance agendas’, paper to be presented at ‘The Political Economy of Surveillance: an international 
research workshop’, 9 - 11 September 2010, Open University, Milton Keynes.  
49 Nicola Harrison,  ‘Undercover Work’, Human Resources, October 2007, pp. 29-32. 
50 Taylor, op cit. 
 
28 
 difference between actions performed such as scrubbing, sweeping, walking and 
even emptying a rubbish bin’.51
 
While both these new developments may be seen as providing useful 
management information, they represent both an intensification of surveillance 
and a diminution of our normal expectations of privacy. We discuss social 
networking under another heading below. But there is also an interesting 
application of networking information in the workplace setting. In 2009, the 
software firm SAP unveiled its ‘Social Network Analyzer’. According to SAP 
blogger Timo Elliott, the system uses Web 2.0 and cloud computing to integrate 
information from LinkedIn, Facebook and other social networking sites to enable 
businesses to manage their internal relationships.52  The aim of the system is to 
enable users to ‘get to know’ colleagues in different parts of the organisational 
hierarchy, and to understand their extended networks of contacts, based on new 
data flows.  Although this application can have benefits in terms of managing the 
day-to-day detail of business meetings, its use for restructuring may imply a role 
for it in dismissing staff.  It also creates a new layer of visibility for employees, 
by generating a tag cloud based on their employees’ interests and networks, 
drawn from social networking data.  
 
Information Processing 
Information processing describes the operations that organisations perform on 
personal information beyond collection, practices often known as ‘dataveillance’, 
data mining, or Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD). In practice – as has 
been shown above in several examples of information collection – there is no 
sharp break between these phases, but the problems are somewhat distinct. We 
are aware that ‘data processing’, in the terms of data protection legislation, 
describes a ‘cradle-to-grave’ arc as far as personal information is concerned, 
from gathering to destruction. However, the term ‘processing’ is used in this 
report in a more limited and perhaps conventional sense to focus upon certain 
prominent activities in the public and private sectors, where personal information 
is analysed, combined, and shared. Since 2006 the stakes have been raised 
around data flows as the commercial and governmental sectors have sought to 
harness the potential of personal data, with attempts to apply a data ‘silver 
bullet’ to strategic ends in both commercial and governmental settings.  
 
                                      
51 Michael Fitzpatrick, ‘Mobile that allows bosses to snoop on staff developed’, BBC News, 10/03/2010, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8559683.stm, accessed 15/06/10. 
52 The application effectively harnesses and commodifies the personal information volunteered by employees as part of 
their social networking activities and brings it to bear on the relationships and opportunities they have at work. 
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 Data combination and analysis 
One of the most significant current trajectories is towards the integration of 
diverse forms of data. For example, whereas previously visual surveillance and 
dataveillance were largely separate, the increase in visual data now exceeds the 
capabilities of either human or conventional software analysis. The development 
of recognition software for visual surveillance has been advancing, but this is 
generally used in quite simple ways: for example, in movement recognition, 
which is the basis of behavioural recognition systems in CCTV. Large amounts of 
extant visual surveillance data are being subjected to specific kinds of recognition 
and context analysis to build up patterns that can then be used for predictive or 
anticipatory actions. Crucial here is the shift to analytics: ‘intelligent’ algorithms 
tasked with identifying ‘targets’ worthy of further scrutiny amidst what data 
analysts often term a ‘tsunami’ of data. 
 
Data mining is also moving to new environments including – as predicted in 2006 
– social networking and online gaming. The 2008 US Director of National 
Intelligence’s Data Mining Report, for example, includes reference to ‘Project 
Reynard’, which is a seedling project to explore the emerging norms of such 
environments and identify deviations that might indicate suspicious activity53, 
and such suggestions surfaced in publications leading up to a possible revised 
Telecommunications Data Bill in the UK. There have also been significant state 
investments in pioneering ‘Web 2.0’ analysis companies.54
 
ANPR and protest activities 
The extension of ANPR systems has provided a major spur to dataveillance. In 
July, 2009 the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) and ACPO issued 
advice to police forces entitled ‘Practice Advice on the Management and Use of 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition’, which detailed the extensive data mining 
potential of the new database. One example given in this Practice Advice 
concerned the collection, under RIPA, of images of potentially violent protesters, 
and loading them onto the central database.55  
 
                                      
53 See: http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/datamining.pdf, accessed 15/06/10. 
54 Such as the CIA’s purchase of a stake in Visible Technologies Inc., a firm which specialises in monitoring new social 
media such as blogs, micro-blogs, forums, customer feedback sites and open social networking sites; see: Noah Shachtman, 
‘U.S. Spies Buy Stake in Firm That Monitors Blogs, Tweets’, Wired, 19/10/09, available at: 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/10/exclusive-us-spies-buy-stake-in-twitter-blog-monitoring-firm/, accessed 
15/06/10. 
55 National Police Improvement Agency, Practice Advice on the Managements and Use of Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition, 2009, p. 54. 
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 While the use of ANPR cameras to identify those who are driving without 
insurance or road tax, or to monitor those suspected of being involved in serious 
crime and disorder, may not be seen as contentious, the extent to which it is 
used to track, monitor, and profile ‘legitimate’ protesters is. For instance, the 
National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) is responsible for providing 
intelligence on ‘domestic extremists’56 and maintains a database of individuals 
identified as a potential threat. How many people are registered on the database 
is secret, but it is estimated to run into thousands.57 It is clear, however, that 
ANPR data are being used routinely to track and monitor political protestors 
logged on the ‘domestic extremists’ database, and that inclusion in the database 
is not confined to those who propagate violence and disorder. Merely being 
‘associated’ with protests that have given rise to ‘crime, disorder and the 
deployment of significant resources’ appears to give the police sufficient 
justification to include such persons in the database and subject them to 
extensive tracking and repeated stops.58 But even those attending peaceful 
protests have also been logged: it was reported that an IT manager with no 
criminal record was stopped 25 times in fewer than 3 years after a ‘protest’ 
marker was placed against his car following his attendance at a small and 
peaceful protest against duck and pheasant shooting.59 This episode suggests 
that attendance at any political protest gathering can now leave individuals open 
to extensive surveillance.  
 
Geodemographics 
Since 2006, a number of new geodemographic products and systems have come 
onto the market. Google StreetView, one of the best known, now has almost 
total coverage of the United Kingdom. However, while there have been privacy 
concerns expressed with regard to the ability to identify individuals or vehicles in 
embarrassing contexts through their chance exposure at the time that the Google 
StreetView photographic collection vans were passing, the system is a static 
photographic view, not a live video feed, and most privacy concerns can been 
easily addressed with simple technological solutions. In May, 2010 – as with 
Facebook – Google responded apologetically to a wave of criticism about the 
                                      
56 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspectorate of Constabulary, Adapting to Protest, London: HMIC, 2009.  
57 Ian Johnston, ‘Peaceful protesters included on police database of “domestic extremists”’, The Daily Telegraph, 26/10/09, 
available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/6433980/Peaceful-protesters-included-on-
police-database-of-domestic-extremists.html, accessed 15/06/10. 
58 Paul Lewis and Rob Evans, ‘Activists repeatedly stopped and searched as police officers “mark” cars’, The Guardian, 
25/10/09, available at: 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/25/surveillance-police-number-plate-recognition, accessed 15/06/10. 
59 Paul Lewis, Rob Evans and Matthew Taylor, ‘Police in £9m scheme to log “domestic extremists”’, The Guardian, 
25/10/09, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/25/police-domestic-extremists-database, accessed 16/07/10. 
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 (apparently incidental) collection of personal information from wireless networks 
by StreetView’s photographic vehicles in the UK. 
 
Of much more concern is the new breed of social geodemographic systems, 
exemplified by Google Latitude. These combine GPS-enabled mobile telephones 
with Google Maps and social networking data. Individuals can choose to have 
their mobile location tracked by selected friends and to track their friends' 
mobiles. While this system is voluntary (opt-in) and consensual, there is the 
potential here for rather less consensual activities though hacking or simply by 
companies integrating databases of mobile telephone location data with other 
publicly available or purchasable data. 
 
Geodemographics are also ‘crowdsourcing’,60 but such crowdsourcing is not 
always done with the consent of those whose information is being sourced. For 
example, the locational computing project, CityWare, trialled in Bath, raised 
concerns for allegedly tracking people's movements without consent via 
Bluetooth wireless.61 There is another small but growing trend to crowdsource 
the analysis of captured data and video images. Early experiments included the 
Shoreditch Digital Bridge project, mentioned in the 2006 report, which allowed 
residents of the Haberdasher's Estate in London to see live feed from the video 
surveillance cameras on their estate.62 Although the experiment was ended in 
2007, others have followed, most notably the Internet Eyes start-up, which 
operates an ‘event notification system’.63 They plan to broadcast surveillance 
footage from paying private business customers on the Internet, with the idea 
that the public will work as monitors. The public participants interact with this 
system as a game where ‘players’ gain points for spotting suspected crimes and 
lose points for false alarms, and monthly prizes are paid out. This particular 
company may or may not succeed; however, just as early examples of social 
networking have disappeared or failed, other more robust or different models 
may well achieve rather greater success. It seems likely that Open-Circuit 
Television in various forms will gradually replace the old Closed-Circuit model. 
 
Welfare administration and social sorting 
                                      
60 Crowdsourcing describes the outsourcing of work to a wide group of people, usually via an open call or competition; see 
Jeff Howe, ‘The Rise of Crowdsourcing’, Wired, 14, 6, 2006, available at: 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html, accessed 15/06/10. 
61 Paul Lewis, ‘Bluetooth is watching: secret study gives Bath a flavour of Big Brother’, The Guardian, 21/07/08, available 
at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jul/21/civilliberties.privacy,  accessed 15/06/10. 
62 Mark Ballard, ‘Home snoop CCTV more popular than Big Brother’ The Register, 11/11/07, available at: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/11/home_tv_cctv_link/, accessed 15/06/10. 
63 Internet Eyes website, available at: http://interneteyes.co.uk/, accessed 15/06/10. 
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 The 2006 Report noted that ‘social sorting increasingly defines the surveillance 
society’ and ‘affords different opportunities to different groups and often amount 
to subtle and often unintended ways of ordering societies, making policy without 
democratic debate’. A focus on risk (and ‘opportunity’) management underlies 
such social sorting and the widespread use of new technologies and their 
associated statistical techniques facilitates it. With the decline of shared risks 
within state-sponsored welfare systems, for example, risk has become 
increasingly an individual responsibility and the management of those risks has 
become an industry in itself. In order to streamline and organize such risks, 
private firms – such as Accenture or Experian – are engaged. They mobilise their 
considerable information technology and statistical skills to sort risky individuals 
into categories for differential treatment.  
 
For example, UK government has been concerned with so-called ‘high cost, high 
risk’ social groups who are vulnerable to ‘social exclusion.’64 One such group is 
young people classified as ‘NEET’ (Not in Education, Employment or Training). 
According to one study, a NEET 17-year old is likely to cost the British taxpayer 
10 times more by the time he or she is 28 than their counterparts in education, 
training or work, just because they may claim benefits, use health services, 
become involved with the criminal justice system or not pay taxes. Social 
intervention, even from the time of pregnancy, is required to avoid social 
exclusion. Thus locating, targeting, tracking and mapping the distribution of such 
groups is vital, as is extensive data sharing to classify more carefully and to 
organise the necessary surveillance. In other words, once socially-sorted, such 
groups – homeless people, drug users and previous offenders are viewed 
similarly – can expect greater and continuing scrutiny that may either exacerbate 
or ameliorate their situation.  
 
Ethnic targeting 
Despite some slowing in growth of air transport passenger numbers since 2005 
(affecting international holidays and domestic flights), more than 150 million 
passengers still go through UK airports each year.65 Scrutinising passengers 
without examining each individually has led airports to rely on profiling and 
screening. But this in turn depends on records such as the PNR that is derived 
                                      
64 See Nicholas Pleace, ‘Workless people and surveillant mashups: Social policy and data-sharing in the UK’ Information, 
Communication and Society, 10, 6, 2007, pp. 943-960. 
65 See, UK Parliament, ‘Statistical information on air passenger numbers and characteristics Collected for the House of 
Lords Science and Technology Committee inquiry into the Air Cabin Environment by the Parliamentary Office of Science 
and Technology (POST)’, 10/2000, available at: http://www.parliament.uk/post/e3.pdf, accessed 15/06/10.
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 from commercial data collected by the airlines from their passengers.66 Since 
9/11 considerable concern has been expressed about the ways that ‘Arab’ and 
‘Muslim’ passengers are disproportionally singled out for special attention and 
experience more delay, not to mention affronts to their dignity, than other 
groups.67  
 
Since 9/11, several incidents and deployments have shown how particular 
groups, especially those deemed ‘Muslim’ or ‘Arab’ or ‘Middle Eastern,’ may 
experience negative discrimination. In Birmingham, for example, ANPR systems 
are used disproportionately – 3 times more – in areas where there is a 
concentrated Muslim population. Introduced as an attempt to combat antisocial 
behaviour, vehicle crime and drug-dealing in the area, the system is actually paid 
for by a ‘Terrorism and Related Matters Fund.’68 Following the local and national 
furore over this scheme in mid-2010, not least in regard to the alleged deception 
and non-transparency about the aims of the system, the Birmingham scheme 
was discontinued and the Home Secretary declared that ANPR as a whole should 
be placed under statutory control.69  
 
Call centres 
Call centres are well known as the service sector’s ‘mass production areas’; 
however they are also custodians of consumer data.  The operation of a call 
centre is based on accurate customer account records so that employees can 
identify customers before talking to them. Outsourced call centres (sub-
contracted to handle calls for other companies) rely on the transfer of customer 
data from their clients in order to operate their businesses.  These domestic and 
international data flows render them vulnerable to abuse through fraud, theft or 
employee sabotage.  In October 2006, Channel 4’s ‘Dispatches’ documentary 
series highlighted the customer data black market in India, prompting an 
investigation by the ICO.  The problem is not unique. In 2007, BBC Scotland 
reported that one in ten Glasgow call centres had been targeted by organised 
criminals. The negative consequences for customers, ranging from identity theft 
                                      
66 See Colin J. Bennett, ‘What Happens When You Book an Airline Ticket (Revisited): The Computer Assisted Passenger 
Profiling System and the Globalization of Personal Data’, in Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter (eds.), Global Surveillance and 
Policing: Border, Security, Identity, Cullompton: Willan, 2005, ch.8. 
67 See Nigel Morgan and Annette Pritchard, ‘Security and social “sorting’: traversing the surveillance-tourism dialectic’, 
Tourist Studies, 5, 2, 2005, pp. 115-32.  
68 Paul Lewis ‘Surveillance cameras in Birmingham track Muslims’ every move’ The Guardian, 04/06/2010, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/04/surveillance-cameras-birmingham-muslims/,  accessed 15/06/10. 
69 Alan Travis, ‘”Big brother” traffic cameras must be regulated, orders Home Secretary’, The Guardian, 04/07/10, 
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jul/04/anpr-surveillance-numberplate-recognition, accessed 15/07/10. 
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 to unwanted phone calls, can be very damaging as, for example, in 2009 when 
T-Mobile employees passed on customer contacts to third parties.70
 
Data Markets 
Data markets have also opened up. Organisations that seemed simple a few 
years ago, for example publishers, have reinvented themselves as databrokers, 
combining information management from academic books and journals, through 
media archives, to personal data collation and analysis. SAP (above) is one 
example; another is Reed Elsevier, which owns companies including Elsevier 
academic journals, LexisNexis newspaper archives, and Choicepoint data 
analysis, and calls itself ‘a world leading provider of professional information 
solutions’.71 Databrokers are a key example of the way in which processing of 
personal data by private organisations has intensified in recent years, yet they 
are barely known to the general public as holders of their personal data.  
 
Information Dissemination 
As has been shown earlier, much of data processing involves specific data 
disclosure, but the main emphasis of the concept of dissemination is on the 
broader communication or disclosure or sharing of personal information to larger 
numbers of organisations, individuals, or the general public. This takes place in a 
variety of contexts, and the concerns that arise may be different. The many – 
and continuing –data breaches and losses that have happened illustrate potential 
or actual uncontrolled dissemination through lapses in information security and in 
the duty of care for confidential information on individuals. Dissemination also 
occurs with regard to the release of information under the Freedom of 
Information (FOI) regime, when personal details may either be redacted or 
exposed depending upon the determination of the public interest. Recently, FOI 
requests and ICO decisions about, for instance, the expenses claimed by 
Members of Parliament, have highlighted the somewhat paradoxical way in which 
privacy issues are often engaged, and debate fostered, by the exercise of the 
countervailing public right to know.  
 
Data sharing 
The 2006 report identified flows of data from people to databases, and between 
databases, as a key process underpinning the surveillance society.  Whilst many 
                                      
70 Amy Fallon, ‘T-Mobile staff sold customers' details to rivals’, The Independent, 18/11/2009, available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/tmobile-staff-sold-customers-details-to-rivals-
1822232.html, accessed 15/06/10. 
71 Reed Elsevier website, available at: http://www.reed-elsevier.com/aboutus/our-business/Pages/Home.aspx, accessed 
15/06/2010. See also: David Murakami Wood, ‘Spies in the Information Economy: Academic Publishers and the Trade in 
Personal Information’, ACME, 8, 3, 2009, pp. 484-93. 
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 of us willingly consent to the giving of our personal information in one setting, 
the flow of data from that setting to another (e.g., from commerce to policing, as 
with Oyster Cards) requires description and comment.  Data are frequently 
traded and transferred, and while surveillance may have adverse effects, data 
flows can also confer benefits and opportunities.  For individuals, the sharing of 
personal data can cement friendship bonds, enhance leisure and career 
opportunities, and create greater convenience. For businesses, the gathering of 
more detailed customer and competitor data can create commercial 
opportunities. For the public sector, knowing how citizens use resources can 
result in the better targeting of services, and more efficient use of resources. For 
government, security, crime control and other policy objectives are facilitated by 
new data flows from private and public sector partners.  
 
Pressures towards more extensive data sharing in the UK have mounted in the 
years since 2006, with renewed attempts to provide ‘transformational 
government’, including more integrated public services to individuals based on 
identifying them, verifying their claims to services, and collating personal 
information from various databases. The sharing of data – or the tragic lack of it 
– has featured prominently in social care and policing practice, and particularly in 
child-protection cases since the Bichard Report (2004). It has also been a major 
element in law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and in combating fraud. This has 
fuelled greater efforts by government to overcome real and perceived obstacles 
to access to data, whether legal barriers, operational practices, or organisational 
frictions. Clause 152 of the Coroners and Justice Bill in 2009 aimed to give 
Ministers wide powers to authorise data sharing through secondary legislation 
where they deem it necessary and proportionate, thus sweeping away all 
barriers. However, the clause was withdrawn by the previous Government 
following strong and widespread opposition. In the commercial world, the sharing 
of data across companies and sectors, and between the private and public 
sectors generally, have become increasingly normal. The state’s reliance on 
exchanges with information-service companies such as Experian when processing 
individuals’ applications for, for example, drivers’ licences, has become a routine 
part of operational procedures.   
 
Social networking 
The explosion of social networking has enabled a revolution in how people, 
particularly younger people, communicate with family and friends. However, 
since 2006 the proliferation of complex modifications to the way in which the 
dominant social networking company, Facebook, operates significantly changed 
how and to whom personal data contained on a person's profile are made 
available.  In particular, Facebook allowed information previously restricted to 
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 those registered as a 'friend' of the user to be shared by all.  As the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation pointed out, Facebook now treats lists of friends, names and 
many other personal details, as publicly available information.72 Following public 
concern, including prominent NGO and regulatory-agency action in Canada, in 
2009, and again in 2010, Facebook retreated from its privacy-unfriendly 
practices and undertook to simplify and improve its privacy settings in order to 
facilitate individual control and the transparency over the treatment of 
subscribers’ personal information.  
 
The significance of developments in the management of social networking is in 
the power that they give to create extended profiles of a person. For instance, by 
analysing the publicly available data revealed by an individual on their Facebook 
pages and combining it with data from their friends’ pages, it is technically 
possible to predict political affiliations73 or even sexual orientation.74 In addition, 
commercial organisations are already developing software applications to enable 
businesses to integrate social network data about their employees into their 
corporate systems, as seen with SAP, above. 
 
5 - Implications, Issues and Problems 
 
This discussion now turns from the description of examples to highlight a number 
of important issues to which they give rise: issues that represent challenges to 
society generally, to the individuals whose personal information is involved, to 
regulatory policy-makers, and to regulatory practice based on legal rules and 
principles. 
 
Privacy, ethics and human rights 
Privacy remains a key concern, whether to do with the collection, use and misuse 
of databases or with other domains of surveillance. This report cannot discuss the 
myriad and well-known ways in which surveillance practices impact upon privacy 
and human rights, but a few relatively novel developments can be highlighted. 
Recent experiences with body scanning have highlighted the importance of bodily 
privacy in public places. A number of privacy-enhancing solutions to this problem 
                                      
72 Kevin Bankston, ‘Commentary: Facebook's New Privacy Changes: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly’, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 09/12/09, available at: http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/facebooks-new-privacy-changes-good-
bad-and-ugly, accessed 15/06/10. 
73 Jack Lindamood, Raymond Heatherly, Murat Kantarcioglu and Bhavani Thuraisingham, ‘Inferring private information 
using social network data’, Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on World Wide Web, Madrid, 2009, pp.1145-
6. 
74 Carolyn Y. Johnson, ‘Project Gaydar’, Boston Globe, 20/09/09, available at: 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/09/20/project_gaydar_an_mit_experiment_raises_new_questions_
about_online_privacy/?page=full, accessed 15/06/10. 
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 have been mooted in Canada: developing algorithms which act as ‘privacy filters’, 
reducing or eliminating all personal detail from faces and genital areas; strict 
prohibition of retention and distribution of imagery; a ban on staff bringing 
photographic devices into the scanning area; a physical removal of scan 
monitoring to closed rooms and access to personal identification of the passenger 
throughput; and detailed audits to ensure compliance with these regulations.  
 
Video analytics are also a case in point. The limited protections and rights for 
those captured by video surveillance become even less relevant once the 
secondary data generated through analytics allows the reconstruction of patterns 
of movement, possible place of residence, favourite locations and so on. A major 
concern is the use of analytics software to scan a scene automatically, identifying 
patterns and presences which are deemed ‘abnormal’ within a normative 
definition of what occurs ‘normally’ at that time and place within a city. Analytics 
systems in general facilitate new combinations of data about a subject that, after 
analysis, create a more fine-grained picture and expose the subject in new ways, 
raising privacy concerns. 
 
The privacy problems associated with drones are worth mentioning here: 
specifically, they relate to the extent to which those present ‘in public’ can claim 
any kind of right to privacy. Drones also present a more pervasive form of 
surveillance than CCTV because of their mobility. They raise significant problems 
in terms of consent and notice, as they are barely visible from the ground, and 
yet have the potential to track and film people in real time. Issues around 
proportionality arise when they are following a ‘target’.   
 
Flows of data into new domains of application, particularly those that attempt to 
create total or mandatory visibility of the person, also raise significant concerns.  
Perhaps the most prominent of these discussed in this report is the question of 
whether the e-Borders programme challenges freedom of movement within the 
EU, and is compatible with the national data protection laws of other Member 
States.75 Notwithstanding the recent change of Government, commitment to a 
project that stipulates the mandatory collection and retention of detailed personal 
information from each traveller was always going to raise privacy and other 
concerns about the legality, necessity and proportionality of the scheme. 
 
 
                                      
75 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, UK Border Agency: Follow-up on Asylum Cases and E-Borders 
Programme, Twelfth Report of Session 2009-10, HC 406. 
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 However, as noted in the 2006 Report, there are social and ethical values other 
than privacy that are also challenged or damaged by surveillance. Here, the 
threat to trust must be emphasised, and it is important to continue to underline 
the way in which ‘social sorting’ contributes to the drawing of social distinctions. 
People are sorted into categories (including gender, socio-economic, religious and 
ethnic/national) in order to distribute opportunities and risks according to some 
institutional criteria. The effects are often subtle and complex but with everyday 
consequences for work, travel, consumption and relations with official bodies. As 
the examples show, the distinctions are often reinforced in the process as well.76   
 
It is import to recall, in the words of the 2006 Report, that ‘[n]o one has voted 
for such systems. They come about through processes of joined-up government, 
utility and services outsourcing, pressure from technology corporations and the 
ascendancy of actuarial practices.’ Social sorting is nowhere an official, legislated 
process. It is one in which statistical categories determine differential treatment 
for different population groups, directly affecting their life-chances and 
opportunities. But while it clearly affects social ethics and justice it is not in any 
sense subject to democratic participation.  
 
The sharing of data sits uneasily alongside concerns about confidentiality, 
particularly of ‘sensitive’ data of the kind typically used in personal public 
services. It also complicates the question of consent to the secondary use of 
personal data for purposes not clearly related to those envisaged at the time of 
collection, and cuts across what many people expect or believe happens to their 
data. Lack of transparency and control are important issues, as people may feel 
powerless to prevent the processing and sharing of their information by 
organisations on which they are dependent for important benefits and services.  
 
Finally, the international flow of consumer data to non-EU jurisdictions raises 
data protection issues. Currently non-EU call centres are required to build data 
protection principles into service contracts, leaving data protection practices 
vulnerable to the stresses and strains of call-centre life.  Recent call-centre data 
protection scandals in non-EU countries highlight this as a continuing concern. 
 
‘Function creep’ 
The 2006 Report identified a process of ‘function creep’ that was noticeable in 
surveillance. Function creep occurs when a technology introduced for one 
purpose is then used to fulfil other purposes. Function creep is not an inherently 
                                      
76 See Oscar Gandy, Coming to Terms with Chance: Engaging Rational Discrimination and Cumulative Disadvantage, 
London: Ashgate, 2010. 
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 negative concept, for much beneficial innovation rests on finding new uses for 
existing applications and technologies.  However, in the context of data 
protection and privacy considerations, if personal data – collected and used for 
one purpose – migrates to other ones, then surveillance can become intensified 
and privacy rights breached beyond what was originally understood and 
considered socially, ethically and legally acceptable. The previous discussion of 
cameras in pubs and schools, the police use of unmanned drones, mobile phone 
technology, social networking, and APNR – for example, its use by car-park 
operators – has illustrated the process in various domains.  
 
Clearly in the case of TfL, the ANPR cameras were installed for the purpose of 
enabling and enforcing the central London Congestion Charge scheme, but the 
data are now shared with the police for national intelligence purposes. This is 
arguably legitimate and beneficial, and has independent oversight because the 
ICO will receive an annual report from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police on the operation of this data-sharing agreement. So, too, would be the use 
of ANPR in the case of violent protest. However, the logging of political protestors 
lawfully exercising their right to protest peacefully is arguably less legitimate. A 
second egregious example is the changes made by Facebook to its privacy 
settings, as a technology sold to its users as a means to communicate with 
family, friends and acquaintances now allows that information to be lifted out of 
context, merged, and reanalysed in contexts that were never imagined or 
consented to by the owners of the data. Third, the use of UAVs for policing 
demonstrates another form of function creep: the migration to domestic policing 
of a technology developed to track the location and movements of the enemy in 
war. In the context of war, consent, privacy, and data protection may be little 
considered, but in the context of the mundane policing of citizens, such 
considerations should not be so easily abandoned.  
 
As systems are designed with interoperability in mind, new products, and new 
surveillance possibilities, can emerge as older technologies come together to 
create functions. Once established, systems can easily be ‘locked in’, while 
business processes are developed on the assumption that function creep is a 
benefit without drawbacks. Function creep often happens unobtrusively: for 
instance, data-mining to profile consumers in an attempt to target marketing 
more effectively. Its rationale is sustained by considerations of economy, 
efficiency, effectiveness and convenience in the exploitation of information 
resources, whether technologies or databases, as assets within the organisation. 
On the other hand, function creep often stretches fair information principles 
towards their limits.  
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 Invasions of privacy may be justified in certain cases when compared with the 
benefits resulting from function creep. This may be particularly so where the 
nature of the invasion does not violate what people have come to accept as a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, surveillance devices, developed for 
military, anti-fraud, or revenue purposes may migrate to applications affecting 
larger numbers or new categories of the civilian population. The use of these 
tools often connote suspicion of wrongdoing requiring monitoring, and may step 
over the boundary of what is tolerable in a society that upholds human rights and 
in which ethical norms shape the approach to privacy protection. The further 
uses of UAVs, police databases and mobile phone technology particularly raise 
these concerns, and may be detrimental to the climate of trust that is necessary 
for social and citizen-state relationships. Function creep facilitates the erosion of 
these values and rights, even where the intention is benign.  
 
Transparency and accountability 
As can be seen in the cases of social networking and CCTV in schools, when there 
is migration from the original purpose or functionality, it is normally difficult for 
members of the public, policy-makers and regulators to keep track and to fix 
responsibility on those who were originally identified as controllers or custodians. 
This is, in part, because function creep is incremental and does not necessarily 
create a clearly new system or use that would give rise to such questions, or to a 
subsequent reconsideration of the grounds on which the original function was 
deemed to be acceptable, necessary or proportionate. Given the relatively low 
level of public and political understanding of technologies such as databases, it is 
too easy for functions to creep surreptitiously without exposure to widespread 
comment, debate, or procedures for deciding on the acceptability and 
accountability of the new functions or uses.  
 
The flow of data between databases is a normal aspect of everyday personal, 
commercial and governmental life. Databases and the data that flow between 
them are key elements of infrastructure, and hence their effects only become 
apparent when those infrastructures fail, as recent losses of government data 
illustrate. Rendering these everyday systems accountable and transparent is 
particularly difficult in commercial operations where the ownership of personal 
data – such as customer account details – is the basis of competitive advantage.  
Law-enforcement bodies would also argue that making ANPR and other data 
flows transparent would undermine their efforts to fight crime. However, in the 
case of deliberate commercial and governmental attempts to harness data to 
strategic ends, it may be possible to identify aspects that represent intensified 
surveillance, and that should attract regulation. The use of personal social 
networking data to inform business decisions is a key example. Privacy Impact 
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 Assessment (PIA), expanded to highlight non-privacy impacts, could identify 
problems with the use of data from an employee’s non-work life in the 
workplace. In the realm of law enforcement, FOI requests have been used to 
great effect to reveal data flows around ANPR; however their piecemeal nature 
undermines the introduction of more sustained reporting requirements on data 
use and analysis by the police.  
 
In the case of new uses for data, especially disclosures or sharing of data, issues 
of consent and control can be more difficult to address if there is a lack of 
transparency and weak systems of accountability. These points are revisited 
later, when the regulatory implications of function creep as well as other 
processes are considered. 
 
Blurring of the public and the private, and unintended consequences 
Controversies surrounding the movement of data across public/private 
boundaries either at a personal or an organisational level are illustrated by the 
examples included in this report. For example, worker responses to body 
scanning highlight the sometimes irresistible urge of voyeuristic opportunism 
when the private and taboo (i.e., nudity) is made public.  The same danger 
applies when managers are able to peer into the Facebook and LinkedIn pages of 
their employees. Both examples also represent unintended consequences. Wider 
experiences of air carriers involved in the e-Borders programme have highlighted 
the huge investments needed to transfer data from a large number of private 
organisations, originating in different formats and in different parts of the world, 
to one central point in the public sector. Once again, the use of ANPR and DVLA 
data provides other illustrations of the blurring of boundaries between the state 
and the private sector with regard to personal data flows.   
 
Finally, with data analysis, the ownership of multiple data sources creates 
enormous economic value, and economic actors may be tempted to overstep the 
mark in data analysis and their subsequent commercial strategies. Data flows are 
notoriously opaque and hence difficult to render accountable and transparent. 
Their start and end points are difficult to define, as are the paths that they take, 
which often lie deep in the proprietary systems of private actors or public-sector 
agencies. And finally, the longer and more complex the flow, the more likely that 
there will be unintended consequences for data subjects, even in the most legal 
and transparent examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 6 - Regulatory Developments and Problems  
 
The challenges posed to regulation 
As the previous section of this report has shown, there is a formidable array of 
continuing and new surveillance challenges to protecting information privacy and 
other individual and social values, including autonomy, dignity, and equality. 
These challenges have been met with some important recent countervailing 
action, in which the ICO has played a leading part. However, there are 
constraints on the activity that any regulator can take within a framework of legal 
controls. This is because the governance of CCTV, ANPR, the forensic use of DNA, 
and other surveillance and data collection practices takes place in an under-
regulated environment, leaving the individual or social group without a statutory 
basis for granting consent, discovering what is happening, or obtaining remedy. 
Only in certain circumstances does much surveillance fall within the purview of 
general laws such as the Data Protection Act (DPA) 1998 and the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, which permit wide exemptions from all or 
part of their provisions. 
   
Much of the preventative and remedial activity, as well as efforts to warn about 
threats to privacy and liberties, has taken place through the opportunities 
provided by the occurrence of scandals, ‘security storms’ and ‘horror stories’ of 
one kind or other. These have included the loss of massive amounts of personal 
data through carelessness and confusion, poor organisational practice, and 
weakness in information security across public as well as private-sector 
organisations.77 They have also involved the often organised, large-scale and 
illegal buying and selling of personal information held within public and other 
bodies.78 Government’s plans to keep details of the internet and telephone 
communications of the entire population, as well as the continued development 
of centralised public-sector databases, including the promotion of extensive data 
sharing and profiling, have continued apace during these years, with some 
changes and occasional reversals. These are only some of the issues that have 
fashioned the agenda for regulation. 
 
Regulatory responses 
Parliamentary and governmental reports, and those of outside NGOs and think 
tanks, have contributed strongly to resisting and limiting the adverse effects of 
                                      
77 See, for example, Kieran Poynter, Review of Information Security at HM Revenue and Customs: Final Report, 2008; 
Cabinet Office, Data Handling Procedures in Government: Final Report, 2008; Sir Edmund Burton, Report into the Loss 
of MOD Personal Data: Final Report, Ministry of Defence, 2008. 
78 ICO, What Price Privacy Now?, ICO, 2006.  
 
43 
 surveillance and poor data handling and management. They have urged more 
effective rules and guidelines for information practices that, if left to themselves, 
would only aggravate the problems individuals and groups face regarding the 
collection, processing and disclosure of their information. These reports have 
highlighted many of the issues that the Report on the Surveillance Society 
brought into public debate in 2006, and that itself inspired some of the 
parliamentary and group investigations in the years since. The House of Lords 
Constitution Committee Report, for example, pointed to surveillance’s ‘powerful 
influence over the relationship between individuals and the state, and between 
individuals themselves’, thus signifying the importance of surveillance to the very 
life of our society, going beyond its effect on individual privacy rights and the 
question of data protection as such.79
 
Following the discovery of massive data breaches by Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs, amongst other departments and agencies, government itself responded 
by tightening up its approach to data handling. In 2008, it promoted new 
security, management, and training regimes, and specific techniques including a 
better understanding of information risk, across the public sector in order to 
improve the culture and accountability for the public’s personal data.80 How far 
these have actually taken root, and how uniformly, is not easy to determine, 
although a recent review describes important progress81. The impact of the new 
Government cannot yet be determined. 
 
However, the lessons learnt from data breaches will more likely be those 
concerning data security, rather than of the wider range of privacy and 
surveillance issues, such as excessive data collection and disproportionate 
analysis and sharing of data. If that is so, many facets of surveillance and privacy 
invasion will not be subject to sufficient regulatory renewal unless attention is 
deliberately focused on them through parliamentary, governmental, and non-
governmental routes. The Thomas-Walport Review82 went some way towards 
casting light on the question of data sharing and towards putting it on a more 
privacy-friendly footing, partly by clarifying the nature of the judgments and 
decisions required when considering the sharing of data. A number of its 
recommendations were in line with the new governmental approach to data 
handling, and emphasised the importance of transparency, accountability, and 
audit, plus vigorous action by regulatory officials to keep these cultural changes 
                                      
79 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 2nd Report of Session 2008-09, Surveillance: Citizens and the 
State, HL Paper 18-I, para. 3. 
80 Cabinet Office, Data Handling Procedures in Government: Final Report, 2008. 
81 Cabinet Office, Protecting Information in Government, 2010. 
82 Richard Thomas and Mark Walport (2008) Data Sharing Review Report, Ministry of Justice, 2008.  
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 in motion.    
 
It is encouraging that practical recommendations for better instruments and 
safeguards to be deployed by official regulators have been made in several 
reports in recent years, increasing the likelihood of stronger regulation that 
addresses surveillance issues beyond data security. The ICO has championed the 
development of instruments that, if implemented on a significant scale, might 
help to keep surveillance in check and mitigate or prevent the misuse of personal 
data. For example, PIA has been actively encouraged and a framework for its use 
has been produced and further revised.83 PIAs could play an important part in 
mitigating function creep and, if published, help improve transparency. A new 
Code of Practice for CCTV was adopted in 2008.84 It, too, will assist in the 
assessment of impact not only on privacy but on other values that people 
cherish, in reinforcing purpose-specificity, and in promoting transparency and 
accountability for CCTV systems. The Government has promised further 
regulation in this area, but without detail at the time of writing. 
 
A new statutory Code of Practice for Data Sharing – an outcome of the Thomas-
Walport Review – is nearing completion, potentially clarifying the validity and 
limits of data sharing and providing a better basis for making decisions about 
when to share data, with whom, and why. Reflecting international initiatives, 
Privacy by Design (PbD)85 has been recognised, encouraging information 
technologists to build privacy protection into their systems architecture and 
specific products from the start.  
 
All these initiatives can be seen as part of a strong regulatory package, but how 
far they will – or can – be implemented in practice by normally reluctant 
companies and public agencies will determine their value. Sceptics will say that 
there are few examples, anywhere, of effective and non-perfunctory PIAs that 
actually modify the plans or practices of organisations. Codes of Practice can 
often become symbolic tokens rather than having truly implementable regulatory 
force. The value of PbD, which so far has more champions than practitioners, is 
as yet unproven: the business case for its precursor, Privacy-Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs), has not caught on to the extent that supporters envisaged.  
                                      
83 ICO, Privacy Impact Assessment Handbook Version 2.0, 06/2009, available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pia_handbook_html_v2/index.html, accessed 09/06/10 
84 ICO, CCTV Code of Practice, Revised Edition 2008, available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/ico_cctvfinal_2301.pdf, 
accessed 09/06/10. 
85 ICO, Privacy by Design, 2008, available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/pdb_report_html/privacy_by_design_report_v2.pdf, accessed 09/06/10 
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However, these regulatory initiatives are advantageously grounded in the law 
and in the principles and values of privacy and human rights underpinning the 
law, and do not offer easy options to avoid, displace, or circumvent these. The 
values and principles that provide the basis for Codes, assessment tools, and 
technical design are the very ones that are already well-known in data protection 
and human rights law, usually invoked by those who press for a limitation of the 
adverse effects of surveillance. Therefore, their proper implementation is likely to 
represent a significant effort in limiting surveillance. 
  
Regulation in future 
Regulatory efforts in the UK have not been best served by existing data 
protection and privacy law: the former is relatively weak in its domestic 
transposition of the European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC86, and – 
in any comprehensive and focused sense – privacy law is largely absent, 
although the right to privacy is explicitly and frequently mentioned in the 
Directive that our Data Protection Act was intended to transpose. These 
restrictions have set outer limits to what can be expected of a regulatory regime 
that might safeguard individuals and society from the excesses of surveillance, 
although it is a promising sign that change in the law and its articulation with 
human rights legislation, and reform of the Directive, are still on the agenda.  
 
In particular, how the collection of data can be minimised or stopped will remain 
an important question. It will require sustained debate about what would 
constitute legitimate and acceptable purposes, and desirable limits. Clarity about 
this has been to some extent assisted by the raising of public and parliamentary 
awareness of surveillance in recent years, but continuous efforts by official 
regulators such as the ICO and other Commissioners will be required to reinforce 
and extend the platform that has begun to be put in place.  
 
Surveillance cannot be effectively constrained without a more rigorous regime of 
law, supervision and enforcement. The enactment of positive legislation to create 
or to reform the regulation of surveillance activities where it is absent or deficient 
must play an important part in the near future. Regulation would be assisted by 
reform of the legal framework – perhaps tightening the link with human rights 
including the right to privacy – and of the powers available to regulators, 
whether generally or with respect to specific or sectoral surveillance activities. 
                                      
86 See the European Commission’s ‘reasoned opinion’ of 24 June 2010 on UK compliance with the Directive, in ‘Data 
protection: Commission requests UK to strengthen powers of national data protection authority, as required by EU law’, 
available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/811, accessed 12/07/10. 
 
46 
 The promised repeal of some of the statutory or administrative basis for 
surveillance will be an important step: for instance the repeal of the Identity 
Cards Act 2006 and the destruction of the NIR, the reappraisal of ContactPoint, 
and the cancellation of the next generation of biometric passports. The prospect 
of further legislative dismantling of parts of the ‘database state’ and the reform 
of human rights legislation cannot yet be evaluated in terms of their implications 
for surveillance itself or for the ability of regulators to enforce other laws, such as 
the DPA, more effectively. It would be important for any such dismantling to be 
investigated – by Parliament, but not exclusively – in terms of whether it actually 
amounts to a net increase in privacy protection and a diminution of surveillance, 
or instead merely to a reorganisation of current functions – such as systems of 
identification and authentication – without essential reform of the scope and 
intensity of surveillance.  
 
Given the powerful commercial, governmental, and popular forces that brought 
about an intensification of surveillance in the first place, there may be 
considerable resistance to giving up the right, or the felt need, to hold so much 
information on citizens and consumers, to share it with other agencies, and to 
analyse it to yield new and potentially valuable information. There is also likely to 
be resistance to reining in the proliferation of video surveillance, to curbing the 
excesses of DNA collection, and to modifying information systems that relate to 
the safety of vulnerable persons. ‘Knee-jerk’ reactions to tragic incidents are 
likely to continue to be favoured. In these contexts, governmental self-restraint 
and careful scrutiny by Parliament, regulators, NGOs, the media, and the wider 
public would seem to be essential.    
 
Significant recent changes that are expected to strengthen regulation are the 
increase in the ICO’s budget through a new system of fees for data controllers’ 
notifications, the new power to impose large financial penalties for reckless and 
wilful breach of the data protection principles, and the enactment of new 
inspection and assessment powers for the ICO. Unfortunately, the failure to 
extend the latter to the supervision of the public sector outside central 
government, or, in particular, to the private sector, is out of keeping with the 
need to regulate more effectively the privacy implications of the state’s 
increasing involvement of the private sector in the provision of information 
services for public-sector activities. It also leaves unstrengthened the ability to 
regulate the private sector’s extensive and intensive surveillance and data 
collection activities as such, some of which have adverse social-sorting and 
discriminatory effects in the commercial world.  
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 Including some of these changes mentioned above, the House of Lords 2009 
Report also made many recommendations for improving not only the legal 
framework but also the ancillary and supportive mechanisms that might make 
regulation work more effectively. These would include roles for civil-society 
organisations and the general public. The ICO welcomed most of the 
recommendations,87 some of which were already said to be in train, although 
relatively few of them have yet to be fully adopted by Government and others 
have been resisted. This report is not the place to review these possibilities at 
any length, but a few of them can be commented on as of particular importance 
in denoting some areas that Parliament and Government may consider unfinished 
business. 
 
First, the inspection regimes of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner and the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner, who have RIPA responsibilities, 
would benefit from greater flexibility so that they can promptly investigate cases 
of alleged disproportionate or unnecessary use of RIPA. Moreover, a more 
coherent relationship between the Commissioners who act under RIPA, and with 
the ICO, would help to increase public confidence in the regulation of 
surveillance. Second, in view of their apparently excessive and perhaps arbitrary 
use of surveillance powers under RIPA, consideration should be given whether 
local authorities, rather than the police, are the appropriate bodies to exercise 
such powers. If they are found to be the appropriate bodies, such powers should 
only be available for the investigation of serious criminal offences, and in any 
case should only be exercised where strictly necessary, and in an appropriate and 
proportionate way. Third, a system of judicial oversight for surveillance carried 
out by public authorities would be a major improvement, along with individuals 
who have been made the subject of surveillance being informed of that 
surveillance, when completed, where no investigation might be prejudiced as a 
result. Compensation for persons subject to unlawful surveillance by the police, 
intelligence services, or other public bodies would help in inducing a further 
measure of self-restraint. 
 
Finally, regulation and the limitation of surveillance can only go so far within the 
confines of one country, applying that country’s legal and regulatory powers and 
resources. As with money, information collected by surveillance practices and 
instruments flows across national boundaries in a variety of contexts: counter-
                                      
87 ICO, ‘Information Commissioner’s response to The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Inquiry into 
“Surveillance: Citizens and the State”’, 2009, available at: 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/ico_response_to_hol_constitut
ion_committee.pdf, accessed 09/06/10.  
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 terrorist activities, law enforcement, international commerce – online and 
otherwise – and public services. The problems of regulation, as well as the 
opportunities, are already being realised at European and wider international 
levels.88 UK government as well as ICO participate in these processes of 
deliberation and of forming more effective and collaborative responses to the 
challenges of surveillance and privacy threats. These transnational efforts must 
continue to play an important part in protecting the privacy interests and rights 
of UK citizens and residents.    
 
7 - Conclusion 
 
Since 2006, there has been something like the kind of public, media and policy 
debate for which the Report on the Surveillance Society had called. Surveillance 
became an electoral issue, and has been one of the first things addressed by the 
incoming Government. Yet, despite responding to concerns over ID cards, CCTV, 
the DNA database and ContactPoint, in particular, there are still many areas 
where surveillance continues to intensify and expand. Some technologies have 
gone from being a subject of speculation to being in mainstream use in many 
different areas. The national roll-out of ANPR highlights the expansion of video 
surveillance and analysis, and the linking or sharing of data from different 
databases continues. Private-sector data-gathering, analysis and sharing, 
particularly through online social networking tools, has increased exponentially. 
In the immediate future, the growth of crowdsourcing and a movement to ‘open 
circuits’ will add new dimensions, as will the increasing involvement of the EU in 
surveillance and security issues. In the longer run, the advent of ‘ubiquitous 
computing’ in daily life and work, with the deployment of myriad sensing devices 
and analytical tools to predict human behaviour and to provide services or 
controls, will further challenge the regulatory repertory and assumptions that we 
have known for many years up to the present. A report such as the present one, 
conducted four years from now, may have to take these developments into 
account, as the 2016 scenarios projected in the 2006 report had done.     
 
Whether the trajectory of regulation through various instruments, including the 
law, technical means, and self-regulation – and the critical awareness and 
vigilance of public opinion – has matched the continued development of 
surveillance since 2006 is not certain. Some significant steps have been taken to 
increase the powers available in the regulatory system, and there are 
encouraging efforts in the public sector and sometimes in the private sector to 
                                      
88  Charles D. Raab, ‘Information Privacy: Networks of Regulation at the Subglobal Level’, Global Policy, 1,3, 2010 
forthcoming. 
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 change the culture of organisations involved in personal information practices. 
Testing the plans for surveillance systems against the rigorous criteria that might 
be available through PIAs and other assessment methodologies that could be 
adapted to evaluate impacts on other, non-privacy, outcomes of these systems, 
and increasing the pressure on technology designers and users to embed 
privacy-friendly mechanisms into their products and systems, can play an 
important part, but only if these requirements become the norm and not the 
exception. 
 
It will remain an important question, however, whether the current legal 
instruments, at UK and European levels, including specific data protection 
legislation as well as broader human rights law, are robust enough to limit 
surveillance and curb the excesses of data collection, or whether legal reform and 
better integration of legal and other regulatory instruments will be the linchpin 
upon which much else depends.  
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